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THE HISTORY, STATUS, AND FUTURE OF TRIBAL SELFGOVERNANCE UNDER THE INDIAN SELFDETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT
Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne*
This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA), a cornerstone of modern
federal Indian policy. In 1988, amendments to the ISDEAA created the
Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project. By providing a statutory
basis for the broader movement of tribal self-governance, this legislation
recognized and advanced the proposition that Indian tribes can provide
better governmental services to their own members than can distant federal
bureaucracies. Expanded and refined in subsequent legislation in 1994 and
2000, the Self-Governance Policy has proven so successful that today over
50% of all federal Indian programs are carried out by tribes rather than
federal agencies. This article reviews the history of the self-governance
program, identifies challenges to the continued growth of self-governance,
and discusses possible directions that the program could take in the coming
years.
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No right is more sacred to a nation, to a people, than the right to
freely determine its social, economic, political, and cultural
future without external interference. The fullest expression of
this right occurs when a nation freely governs itself. We call the
exercise of this right Self-Determination. The practice of this
right is Self-Governance.1
I. Introduction
After centuries of federal policies ranging from extermination and
removal to assimilation and neglect, tribal self-determination has become
the hallmark of United States Indian policy.2 It is also a human right.3 Like
other nations and sovereign governments, Indian tribes promote their tribal
economies, build governmental infrastructures, provide law and order,
manage tribal natural and cultural resources, meet the healthcare and
educational needs of their members, and perform other governmental
functions.4 For the last forty years, the Indian Self-Determination and
1. Joe DeLaCruz, quoted in LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE COMMC’N & EDUC. PROJECT,
SELF-GOVERNANCE: A NEW PARTNERSHIP 2 (1995) [hereinafter LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE
MANUAL] (on file with authors). Mr. DeLaCruz, the late Quinault Nation President, is
acknowledged by many people throughout Indian country as the tribal sage of selfdetermination and self-governance. See, e.g., Tribal Self-Governance: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (statement of Ron Allen, Chairman,
Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe, noting Mr. DeLaCruz’s role in beginning of self-governance
movement); infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (describing Mr. DeLaCruz’s role in
forming alliance of tribal leaders that pushed for self-governance).
2. See, e.g., Emma R. Gross, The Origins of Self-Determination Ideology and
Constitutional Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY 125 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (discussing the underlying philosophical
justifications for establishing self-determination as the touchstone of federal Indian policy).
3. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/chapter1.shtml (affirming “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples”); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (“Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”).
4. SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 238-54 (1989). The
inherent sovereignty of tribes has long been a cornerstone of federal Indian law. See, e.g.,
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1941) (“[P]owers [of] an Indian
tribe are not . . . delegated . . . by Congress, but rather [are] inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 3 (1987),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2622 (“The present right of Indian tribes to govern
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Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA or Act)5 has provided the legal
framework within which tribes can exercise their right to self-determination
and self-governance, while jump-starting and developing the capacity for
government-building activities.6
The ISDEAA gives tribes the right to assume the responsibility, and
associated funding, to carry out programs, functions, services and activities
(PFSAs) that the United States government would otherwise be obliged to
provide to Indians and Alaska Natives. Examples of such services include
healthcare, education, road construction, and social services.7 Congress
significantly amended the Act in 1988,8 1994,9 and 2000.10 By tribal and
federal accounts alike, the self-determination policy embodied in the

their members and territories flows from a preexisting sovereignty limited, but not abolished,
by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United States.”).
5. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e, 458aa–
458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2006)).
6. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination: The
Political Economy of a Policy That Works 16-17 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Faculty Research
Working Paper Series 1, Paper No. RWP10-043, 2010). For a critical analysis of selfdetermination, see George S. Esber, Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination
Policy, in STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 212
(George Pierre Castile & Robert L. Bee eds., 1992) [hereinafter STATE AND RESERVATION]
Esber criticizes the Act because continued federal control through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) is “greater because of Indians’ dependency on the BIA to carry out the
contracting process that is supposed to more fully involve tribes in the national economy.”
Id. at 213-14.
7. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2186 (2012). In this article, we
often use “tribes” as a shorthand term that includes “tribal organizations,” which the Act
defines as tribal governments or organizations controlled, sanctioned, or chartered by tribal
governments. 25 U.S.C. § 450b(l) (2012). This allows smaller tribes to combine programs
and resources to produce efficiencies of scale.
8. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, repealed by Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18); see
discussion infra Part II.C.
9. Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994 (Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act Amendments of 1994), Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa–hh (2012)); see discussion infra Part II.D.
10. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)). The 2000 Amendments also created
Title VI, which authorizes a feasibility study of including non-IHS agencies in the DHHS for
a tribal self-governance demonstration project. See discussion infra Part II.E.
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ISDEAA has been very successful in assisting tribes to develop their local
economies and build their governmental capacities.11
Despite the centrality of the ISDEAA to the United States’ policy of
tribal self-determination, many treatises on federal Indian law virtually
ignore the Act.12 This article aims to fill that gap by setting forth the history
and potential future direction of self-determination and self-governance,
primarily as a statutory directive of the ISDEAA, but also within the
broader context of tribal-federal relations. Part I briefly recounts the history
of federal Indian law and policy from colonial times to the present, tracing
the vacillating policy from isolation to assimilation to termination to selfdetermination. Part II examines the history and development of the
ISDEAA by analyzing the various amendments and enacted titles: (1) Title
I and self-determination contracts; (2) Title III's self-governance
demonstration program; (3) Title IV's permanent self-governance program
in the Department of the Interior (DOI); and (4) Title V, the permanent selfgovernance program in the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS).13 Part III examines current challenges and opportunities and
suggests future directions for expanding and refining the statutory basis of
tribal self-governance, including expansion of the Act's principles to all
agencies of the federal government. Despite current political challenges and
fiscal constraints, we conclude that tribal self-governance will continue to
expand, benefiting not only Native peoples but all Americans.

11. See e.g., Billy Cypress, Chairman, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Prepared
Statement Before the House Resource Committee (Aug. 3, 1999) (describing selfdetermination as “the most successful Indian policy [ever] adopted by the United States”);
Tribal Self Governance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski) (“There is little dispute within Indian country
that the policy of self-determination . . . is probably one of the best, if not the single best
thing that this Federal Government has ever done to help our Native people.”); 1 NAT’L
INDIAN HEALTH BD., TRIBAL PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELFGOVERNANCE IN HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT 12 (1999) [hereinafter NIHB REPORT]
(Executive Summary) (summarizing findings of study that even with reduced purchasing
power of congressional appropriations for Indian health, the growth of tribal management
under self-determination and self-governance has led to improved health for tribal peoples).
12. See, e.g., DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (6th ed. 2011). This
otherwise excellent 1032-page collection of cases, materials and commentary contains less
than one full page on the ISDEAA scattered among pages 220, 222, and 333.
13. The 2000 amendments enacting Title V also included Title VI, which authorized
DHHS to study the feasibility of extending self-governance to non-IHS programs and
agencies within the Department. See infra Part II.E.3 (discussing results of Title VI
feasibility study and prospects for legislation to implement the study's recommendations).
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II. A Brief History of Federal Indian Law and Policy
Tribal self-governance, of course, is not new. Tribes governed
themselves quite well for millennia before European “discovery” and
conquest. The principles underlying the statutory self-governance programs
derive from inherent tribal sovereignty and the history of interaction
between tribal and Euro-American governments. A brief look at the history
of that interaction helps clarify the basis of the current self-governance law
and policy and where it may be headed in the future.
A. Discovery: Early Relations with the Colonists, Treaties, and the Origins
of Government-to-Government Relations 1776-1826
At the time of European “discovery” of the New World, many tribes
possessed sophisticated forms of government,14 as well as expansive
systems of trade among themselves and with the early colonists.15 Relations
between the colonists and the Indians were based on the understanding that,
where possible, Indians desired to remain a distinct people, governing
themselves on their own lands and on their own terms.16 This much was
recognized by the United States and formed the backdrop to early federal
Indian policy.17
After the Revolutionary War of 1776 and formation of the United States
Constitution in 1789, the relationship between the United States and tribal
governments was ambivalent.18 On the one hand, treaties between the
United States and Indian tribes served as formal recognition of governmentto-government relationships.19 On the other hand, the cultures of the so14. For a discussion of the evolution of traditional tribal governments, see generally
O’BRIEN, supra note 4.
15. See generally WALTER H. MOHR, FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS, 1774-88 (1933)
(recounting the relations between Indian tribes and the early colonists). The 1802 Trade and
Intercourse Act restricted alienation of Indian-owned lands, Act of Mar. 30, 1802, 2 Stat.
139, in addition to authorizing the President to “furnish [Indians] with useful domestic
animals and implements of husbandry, and with goods or money,” id. § 13, 2 Stat. at 143.
16. THOMAS R. BERGER, A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES, NATIVE
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICANS SINCE 1492, at 81–84 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the impacts of
Chief Justice John Marshall’s early recognition of Indian sovereignty).
17. Id.
18. See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 26–
31 (1987) (discussing this tension in the seminal federal Indian law cases).
19. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 26-33 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (discussing the role of treaties in the
United States’ policy of establishing government-to-government relationships with Indian
tribes).
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called “savages” were seen as inferior to white “civilization,” and thus were
treated as doomed to disappear.20 As President George Washington put it in
1783, “the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause the
Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in
shape.”21 A somewhat later and more benign (though insidious) version of
this image figured Indians as children of The Great White Father in
Washington.22
This paternalism and outright hostility coexisted uneasily with
recognition of the separate sovereignty of tribes during the time of the
formation of the United States. In some ways, tribes were analogous to
states of the union or foreign nations, as the Constitution indicated in
granting Congress the exclusive power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”23 This so-called “Indian Commerce Clause” became, and remains,
the primary basis of federal authority over tribes.24 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this clause, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause,25 to
mean that Congress has “plenary power” over tribes.26
20. See generally BRIAN DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN (1982); ROY HARVEY
PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND
(1965).
21. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 1, 2 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990).
22. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1984) [hereinafter PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER].
Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (noting, as evidence that
tribes' relation to the United States resembles that of wards to their guardian, that tribes
“address the president as their great father”). Tribes did appropriate this paternalistic trope
with regularity, but more as a canny rhetorical ploy than from a sense of inferiority.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The apportionment clauses, by excluding “Indians not
taxed” from the population count for purposes of representation in Congress, also appears to
recognize the separate political status of tribes. Id. art I, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by id. amend.
XIV, § 2 (apportioning representation according to population, “excluding Indians not
taxed”).
24. COHEN, supra note 19, at 396-97 (describing Indian commerce clause as “linchpin”
of federal power over Indian affairs and basis of both historic and modern legislation).
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
26. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). The notion that
Congress has plenary power over tribal nations is in tension, if not outright conflict, with
democratic doctrines such as popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the consent of the
governed. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 431, 467 (2005). The doctrine is also suspect under international law. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has stated that federal power over
tribes, while plenary, is not absolute. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–
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From the earliest days of the Republic, the federal government has
recognized a moral as well as legal responsibility toward tribes and their
members, as evidenced in the Northwest Ordinance of 1789: “The utmost
good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent.”27 The gulf
between such official pronouncements and the actual treatment of tribes
proved immense, but the pronouncements did serve to establish the federal
government as the nominal protector of Indian rights.28 With plenary power
came commensurate moral obligations, at least in theory.29
Against this backdrop of contradictory and somewhat incoherent
attitudes, Chief Justice John Marshall authored three landmark United
States Supreme Court opinions in the 1820s and 1830s that established
several foundational principles of federal Indian law.
B. The Marshall Trilogy and the Indian Removal Policy 1826-1887
Chief Justice Marshall's Indian law trilogy, like many of his other
landmark decisions, sought to harmonize competing legal, cultural, and
political traditions. On the one hand, the United States and its predecessor
colonies had long recognized Indian tribes as governments that exercise
sovereignty over their respective territories and people.30 On the other hand,
the ideological justification for dispossessing Indians from their lands
required that tribes not be seen as the equals of Pennsylvania or France, but
rather as savage hordes destined to disappear before the advance of
civilization, as America fulfills its Manifest Destiny to expand across the
continent.31 The key to understanding Marshall's opinions is that they
manage to preserve important tribal rights, including tribes' limited
sovereignty and right to self-governance, while legitimizing what had
already taken place—the expropriation of Indian lands.
10 (1935) (plenary power subject to constitutional restrictions and to limitations inhering in
guardianship role).
27. Ch. 8, n.(a), 1 Stat. 50, 52.
28. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 419-22 (discussing origins of trust responsibility).
29. Id.
30. See O’BRIEN, supra note 4, at 50–53 (discussing the early government policy of
treaty-making and federal regulation of trade and intercourse).
31. See, e.g., PEARCE, supra note 20, at 155 (quoting Thomas Jefferson on “the advance
of civilization” from lawless Indians to semi-barbarous pioneers to pastoral farmers to the
civilization of the seaport towns); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 310 (Peter
Haslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (1690) (using American Indians as his example of primitive
peoples who fail to use their lands efficiently, thus giving more advanced (European)
societies the right to “appropriate” that land).
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In Johnson v. M'Intosh,32 the question was which of two claimants had
title to a parcel of land in present-day Illinois: M’Intosh, who had bought it
from the federal government, or Johnson, who had bought it from the
Illinois and Piankeshaw Nations.33 In holding for the federal grantee, the
Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine of discovery: Whichever European (or
“Christian”) nation “discovers” territory gains “the exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest.”34 Following the Revolutionary War, Great Britain had ceded its
discovery rights to the United States, giving the United States “clear
title . . . subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”35 Thus the tribal
land grant was invalid; only the United States could extinguish Indian title
and convey title to an individual.36 The United States did extinguish Indian
title by purchasing the land from the tribes prior to selling it to M’Intosh.37
Thus the latter prevailed, and the tribal grantee’s successors in interest were
out of luck.38
Although Marshall questions whether the doctrine of discovery accords
with “natural right,” this question is ultimately moot because the doctrine is
“indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled . . .
it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by
Courts of justice.”39 History trumps natural law—or rather, the historical
reality of dispossession creates its own legal justification: might makes

32. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
33. Id. at 571-72.
34. Id. at 587. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of discovery, which already had
a lengthy pedigree in European and American law by Marshall's time, see ROBERT J.
MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED 9-50 (2006). It should be noted that
the concepts of “discovery” and “conquest” are wholly repudiated, notwithstanding their
doctrinal history, by indigenous peoples around the world, including Native Americans. The
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues noted that Discovery doctrine “[i]s
the foundation of the violation of their (Indigenous people’s) human rights.” Special
Rapporteur of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Preliminary Study of the
Impact on Indigenous Peoples of the International Legal Construct Known as the Doctrine
of Discovery, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2010/13 (Feb. 4, 2010).
35. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584-85.
36. Id. at 593-94.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 604-05.
39. Id. at 591-92. Marshall gently mocks the doctrine of discovery even as he upholds it,
locating the roots of the doctrine in the “extravagant . . . pretension,” id. at 591, of the
“potentates of the old world,” id. at 573.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

10

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

right.40 To rule for the Indian grantee would have been to undermine title to
the entire country.41
Johnson v. M'Intosh legitimized the historical process of conquest and
colonization,42 but the decision also enshrined important Indian property
rights and principles of tribal self-governance. European discovery did not
extinguish tribal property rights; although the federal government held
“ultimate title,” tribes retained the right of possession and use.43 This
“Indian title” derives from the inherent sovereignty of tribes, and can only
be extinguished by the federal government.44 Johnson, and Marshall's later
opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, affirmed tribal rights to regulate lands in
which aboriginal title has not been extinguished, even as to the activities of
non-Indians.45 Moreover, although tribes could not grant a land title that
United States courts could recognize, Marshall remarked that tribal
conveyances would be valid under tribal law—although the tribe could
convey only the right of occupancy and not fee title.46 Johnson thus
recognized tribes as separate governments, albeit divested of important
political and property rights.47
Marshall laid the groundwork of the trust relationship in the second of
his trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.48 The Cherokee Nation sought to
40. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832) (“But power, war,
conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and which can
never be controverted by those on whom they descend.”).
41. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 579 (noting that “our whole country [has] been
granted by the crown while in the occupation of the Indians”).
42. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 34, at 50-53; LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY
LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR
LANDS 143-44 (2005) (describing “global” influence of Johnson in former English colonies
such as Canada and Australia).
43. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; id. at 587.
44. See id. at 593; COHEN, supra note 19, at 972-73 (citing cases recognizing and
protecting original Indian title).
45. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557
(1832) (describing tribes as “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive”).
46. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593 (stating that a person purchasing land from
tribes “holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws”). The tribal-federal
“split” between aboriginal and “fee” title also evolved into the trust system under which fee
title to much Indian land is held by the federal government in trust for the use and benefit of
tribes or individual Indians. COHEN, supra note 19, at 967-68.
47. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 52 (stating that the doctrine of discovery divests
tribes of right to deal commercially and diplomatically with any nation other than discoverer,
as well as right to freely alienate land).
48. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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enjoin Georgia from enforcing state laws on tribal lands; the laws were
clearly designed to undermine tribal government and seize tribal lands.49
While expressing sympathy with the Cherokees, Marshall held that the
court lacked jurisdiction.50 The Constitution allows courts to hear
controversies between a state and a foreign state,51 but was the Cherokee
Nation a foreign state? Based on the “numerous treaties” entered into by the
tribal and federal governments, Marshall concluded that tribes clearly were
distinct political entities.52 Like their land base, however, their sovereignty
was limited by treaty cessions and by the historical process of incorporation
by the United States. In a famous passage, Marshall wrote that tribes were
not foreign nations but “domestic dependent nations.”53 Tribes were “in a
state of pupilage” to their civilized tutors.54 “Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”55 According to Marshall,
the Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over disputes involving
states and foreign states, but not tribes or “domestic dependent nations,” so
the Cherokees' remedy was not in the federal courts.
While Marshall's metaphors strike us today as condescending and
paternalistic, they articulated a moral and legal responsibility on the part of
the federal government that would evolve into the enforceable obligations
of a trustee.56 Much of federal Indian law since Marshall, both statutory and
case law, has involved the nature and contours of this trust relationship.57
49. Id. at 15. For example, the Georgia law prohibited the tribal council from meeting
and the tribal court from sitting or judging. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 521–22
(quoting sections 2 and 3 of Georgia act of December 22, 1830).
50. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
51. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1.
52. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
53. Id. at 17. Marshall found support for distinguishing tribes from states of the union
and foreign nations in the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, discussed above. Id.
at 18-19. By entrusting Congress with the power to regulate commerce “with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” the Constitution
distinguishes three distinct classes of entities. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
54. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating that with
plenary power “there arises the duty of protection”); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
226 (1983) (“[I]t naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the
breach of its fiduciary duties.”).
57. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 419–22 (locating roots of trust relationship in the
Marshall trilogy, and noting that “[n]early every piece of modern legislation dealing with
Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes and the
federal government”).
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The third case in Marshall's trilogy involved the relationship between
tribes and states. In Worcester v. Georgia, several missionaries to the
Cherokees were convicted of violating a Georgia law prohibiting nonIndians from residing in Cherokee territory without a license from the
governor.58 The Supreme Court overturned the convictions on the ground
that Georgia's laws did not apply in Cherokee territory, even within the
exterior boundaries of Georgia. Marshall repeatedly affirmed that tribes are
“distinct, independent political communities,” as recognized by the United
States' history of making treaties with tribal (as with foreign)
governments.59 “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force . . . .”60 The flip side of the broad
federal authority over the “ward” by its “guardians” is the correspondingly
limited authority of states over tribes. Worcester established the general
rule, still applicable though riddled with exceptions, that states lack
jurisdiction in Indian territories located within their boundaries.61
This courageous ruling put the Court on a potential collision course with
President Jackson and his Indian Removal Policy.62 At the same time
Marshall was enunciating the United States' responsibilities to its domestic
dependent Indian nations, the government was bent on isolating its “wards”
or “pupils” by removing tribes from the settled southern and eastern regions
of the republic.63 By the early 1800s, it had become clear that tribes in the
East were neither assimilating completely nor retiring into the wilderness
with the wolves, as George Washington had predicted.64 To placate states
chafing at sovereign tribes within their boundaries—and to free up tribal
lands for white settlement—the federal government pursued a policy of
removing eastern tribes to territories in the West.65 With the election of
58. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529 (1832).
59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 561.
61. Id. Worcester's bright-line rule has evolved into a pre-emption test unique to federal
Indian law. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)
(“State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.”).
62. DIPPIE, supra note 20, at 57-59 (describing Georgia-Cherokee controversy as
impetus to removal policy).
63. Id. at 59-61.
64. Id. at 58 (describing Cherokees and other southeastern tribes as “obstacle to
expansionist ambitions”).
65. COHEN, supra note 19, at 48.
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Andrew Jackson in 1828, this removal policy kicked into high gear, and in
1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act.66 Removal was to be
voluntary (per the official policy enunciated in the Northwest Ordinance),
but Jackson made clear that tribes refusing to relocate would lose federal
protection and be subject to state laws and jurisdiction.67 In the end, those
who did not move “voluntarily” (generally through fraud or coercion) were
removed forcibly.68 The Cherokee Trail of Tears is the most infamous of
the forced marches to the new Indian Territory in Oklahoma; many other
tribes suffered similar displacements, with consequent loss of life and
cultural upheaval.69 By the end of the Removal Era, around 1850, most
tribes had been removed from the East, although factions had escaped
removal and eventually gained federal recognition and protection.70
The Cherokee cases represented last-ditch efforts to resist removal.
Although the Cherokees prevailed in Worcester, their cause was doomed
politically.71 Nonetheless, the Marshall trilogy established several enduring
principles of federal Indian law: the inherent sovereignty of tribes; their
status as separate (though dependent) governments; the federal
government's exclusive authority over, and consequent responsibility for,
the “dependent” tribes; and the lack of state power over Indian affairs.
C. Allotment, Assimilation, and Termination 1887-1970
Removal was hardly the enduring solution Jackson and his supporters
envisioned. Within a few decades, rapid westward expansion fueled a
reversal of Indian policy from isolation to assimilation. First, Congress
declared the end of formal government-to-government relations by banning
new treaties in 1871.72 Second, Congress instituted a program of forced

66. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
67. COHEN, supra note 19, at 48.
68. See PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 22, at 214-69.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 638–46 (1978) (describing history of
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians); United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 302-05 (4th
Cir. 1931) (describing the history of North Carolina Cherokees, now known as the Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina).
71. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Case: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality,
21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 530–31 (1969) (describing how the South Carolina nullification
controversy of 1832-1833 united Jackson, the Court, and Georgia, rendering Worcester and
the Cherokees a political “embarrassment”).
72. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566, (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (2012)) (“[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
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assimilation through the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887.73 The
Dawes Act provided for the breakup of tribally owned reservation lands by
allotting them to individual Indian owners. Individual ownership, it was
argued, would speed the “civilization” of Indians by breaking up the old
communal life and making them individualistic farmers.74 “Surplus” lands,
or unallotted tribal lands, were ceded or sold off to non-Indian settlers and
corporations.75 The Indian land base dwindled from 138 million acres in
1887 to forty-eight million acres by 1934.76 Although the policy of
allotment was later repudiated, its legacy can still be seen in the high
parcelization, varying and multiple ownership, and jurisdictional
“checkerboard” of many reservations.77
The allotment era saw the rise of federal domination of life on the
reservations and the corresponding decline in tribal governments; the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) “proliferated as a federal, bureaucratic
alternative to self-governance.”78 Congress solidified the presence and
impact of the BIA when it passed the Snyder Act in 1921.79 The Snyder Act
expanded BIA authority to expend funds for reservation activities such as
healthcare delivery, education, and employment.80 As Congress later noted
in explaining the background of the ISDEAA, “[o]fficials of the BIA
assumed the role of colonial administrators on the reservations and
administered programs and services on the reservations under a policy
which later became known as 'paternalism.'“81
In 1934, Congress repudiated the policy of allotment by passing the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA or Wheeler-Howard Act).82 The IRA
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). Existing treaties were unaffected. Id.
73. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358 (2012)).
74. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995).
75. Id. at 13–14.
76. COHEN, supra note 19, at 79.
77. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (stating that tribal
regulatory jurisdiction generally does not extend to activities of non-members on fee lands
within reservation); Royster, supra note 74, at 46–49.
78. Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1995).
79. Act of Nov. 2, 1921, ch. 114, 42 Stat. 208 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13–
13e (2012)).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 13; COHEN, supra note 19, § 5.03[2].
81. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775, 7781.
82. 48 Pub. L. No. 73-383, Stat. 984–88 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
461–479 (2012)).
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aimed to reverse the erosion of the tribal land base by eliminating allotment
and authorizing the Secretary to take Indian lands into trust (and thus off
state and local tax rolls).83 The IRA also attempted to revitalize tribal selfgovernment by providing for formal adoption of tribal constitutions, tribal
corporations, and formal tribal membership enrollment procedures.84
Twenty years later Congress shifted course once again and embarked on
the Termination Era, during which the United States formally repudiated
government-to-government relations with over one hundred federally
recognized Indian tribes, thus ending their federal recognition as tribes.85
As part of the termination policy, in 1953 Congress passed Public Law 83280 (commonly known as P.L. 280),86 whereby the United States ceded
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians to some states, and authorized
other states to assume jurisdiction over federally recognized tribes within
their borders. The goal of termination was to end federal supervision and
control over the Indian “wards,” weaken tribal governments, and assimilate
83. 25 U.S.C. § 465; see also Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, (1st Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (rejecting non-delegation challenge to § 465 and discussing purpose of statute to end
allotment and assimilation policy), rev'd on other grounds, Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct.
1058 (2009).
84. 25 U.S.C. § 476. For a discussion of the purposes and implementation of the IRA,
see COHEN, supra note 19, at 86–87.
85. House Concurrent Resolution 108 is often cited as the pivotal Act of Congress that
terminated the United States' supervisory role and trust responsibility toward many tribes
and also as Congress's push toward rapid assimilation:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is
declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the
Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within the States of
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the following named
Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from Federal
supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially
applicable to Indians. It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of the Interior should examine all existing legislation dealing with
such Indians, and treaties between the Government of the United States and
such tribe, and report to Congress . . . not late than January 1, 1954, his
recommendations for such legislation as . . . may be necessary to accomplish
the purposes of this resolution.
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132, 83d Cong. (Aug. 1, 1953) (enacted).
86. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321–1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360) (2012)). Under Public Law 280, Congress gave states
jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by Indians in Indian country, and also
transferred certain aspects of civil jurisdiction to states. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). Public Law 280
is currently in effect in the states of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin, with important exceptions for certain tribes. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a).
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individual Indians, often through relocation from reservations to large cities
such as Los Angeles, Chicago and Minneapolis.87
D. Self-Determination 1970-Present
By the 1960s, the termination policy was gradually giving way to
recognition of Indian tribal rights to self-determination. The Kennedy
Administration did not seek to terminate any tribes, and, under the
programs of the Great Society, the Johnson Administration embraced
Indian tribes through unprecedented investments in Indian social programs
and reservation infrastructure.88 In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil
Rights Act,89 making many of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
applicable to Indian tribes while also expressly favoring tribal rights to selfdetermination.90 Also in 1968, President Johnson delivered a special
message to Congress about “The Forgotten American,”91 the first special
message devoted solely to Native Americans and federal Indian policy.
Despite this favorable shift away from termination, President Johnson’s
definition of self-determination was viewed by some critics as more of a
paternalistic image than of beneficial substance.92 For many tribes, selfdetermination went well beyond the concept envisioned by President
87. COHEN, supra note 19, at 91–93.
88. See generally THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS 1961–1969 (2001); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 22 (1983) (discussing the era of self-determination).
The Great Society was President Johnson’s term for a series of domestic programs aimed
primarily at eliminating poverty and racism.
89. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012)); see TRIBAL TERRITORY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
GOVERNANCE 153–55 (John R. Wunder & Cynthia Willis Esqueda eds., 2000) (discussing
the ICRA and the IRA in the context of federal policy shifting towards self-determination);
see also NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (John R. Wunder
ed., 1968) [hereinafter INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS] (analyzing the effects of the ICRA and its
impacts on tribal sovereignty and self-determination).
90. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (defining Indian tribe as a group “recognized as possessing
powers of self-government”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
The Court held in Martinez that the ICRA does not subject tribes to the jurisdiction of
federal courts in civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief to enforce its provisions. Id.
Rather, the ICRA manifests a congressional purpose to protect tribal sovereignty from undue
interference by limiting judicial review in federal courts to review of tribal criminal
convictions by way of habeas corpus. Id.
91. President Johnson, Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the American
Indian: “The Forgotten American,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 336–37, 343–44 (Mar. 6, 1968).
92. See, e.g., S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 200–14 (1973) (discussing
the origins of self-determination).
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Johnson and included legal and political sovereignty, fulfillment of treaty
obligations, the return and protection of homelands, and the continued
maintenance of the United States’ trust responsibilities.93 In 1970, President
Nixon largely embraced this vision and ushered in a new era of federal
Indian policy, calling for self-determination for all Indian tribes.94
Recognizing that the Termination Era was a disaster for tribal governments
throughout Indian country, President Nixon urged the abolition of
termination and its corrosive effects on tribal communities:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable,
because it produces bad practical results, and because the mere
threat of termination tends to discourage self-sufficiency among
Indian groups, I am asking the Congress to pass a new
Concurrent Resolution which would expressly renounce,
repudiate and repeal the termination policy. . . . [S]elfdetermination among the Indian people can and must be
encouraged without the threat of eventual termination. In my
view, in fact, that is the only way that self-determination can be
effectively fostered.95
Although Congress retained its plenary control over Indian affairs,96
President Nixon recognized that federal bureaucracies had largely failed
Indian peoples, and that the time had come for a fresh approach. “Indians
will get better programs and that public monies will be more effectively
expended if the people who are most affected by these programs are
responsible for operating them.”97
To the surprise of many observers in Indian country, President Nixon
resolved to define self-determination specifically and to make selfdetermination the official federal Indian policy.98 The President proposed a
93. Id. Some tribal leaders even argued that self-determination required strong tribal
independence separate from the United States, rather than having the United States supervise
limited economic development. Id. at 160.
94. PRESIDENT NIXON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
INDIAN POLICY, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 3 (1970) [hereinafter NIXON’S MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS].
95. Id.
96. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
97. NIXON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, supra note 94.
98. INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89. Louis R. Bruce, a Mohawk-Sioux from Pine
Ridge and Nixon’s Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and LaDonna Harris, a Comanche and
the wife of Senator Fred Harris (D-Okla.), were instrumental in crafting Nixon’s message to
Congress. Id.
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legislative package designed to expedite transfer of the administration of
federal programs that benefit Indian people to Indian tribal governments. It
took Congress nearly five years to respond, but ultimately it passed the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.99 This
Act reflects congressional acceptance of tribal autonomy and the failure of
termination policies.100
III. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
The ISDEAA is largely concerned with strengthening tribal governments
and tribal organizations on Indian reservations by emphasizing tribal
administration of federal Indian programs, services, functions, and
activities, as well as associated funds.101 The Act currently consists of five
major sections: (1) a self-determination contracting program within the BIA
and the Indian Health Service (IHS) under Title I;102 (2) education
assistance programs under Title II;103 (3) a permanent self-governance
program within the DOI for both BIA and non-BIA programs under Title
IV;104 (4) a permanent self-governance program within the DHHS under
Title V;105 and (5) a feasibility study for including non-IHS agencies within
the DHHS in a self-governance demonstration project under Title VI.106

99. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n,
455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)).
100. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775,
7782 (describing twentieth-century federal Indian policy, including “a brief, though
disastrous experiment with the so-called ‘termination’ policy”).
101. THEODORE W. TAYLOR, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 161 (1983) (providing an
overview of the Act and the policy of self-determination).
102. See discussion infra Part II.A.
103. This article will not address this Title in any great depth.
104. For example, programs operated for the benefit of Indians because of their status as
Indians by the Bureau of Reclamation (a non-BIA bureau within the DOI). See discussion
infra Part II.D.
105. In 2000, Congress repealed the self-governance demonstration project under Title
III and placed it within the permanent self-governance program under Title V. Tribal SelfGovernance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)); see also discussion infra Part II.E.
106. See discussion infra Part II.E.3.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/1

No. 1] HISTORY, STATUS & FUTURE OF SELF-GOVERNANCE

19

A. Title I and the 1975 Act
1. Early Models and the Nixon Administration
The earliest models of self-government and self-determination were
found in the restoration bills of previously terminated tribes,107 as well as
through important efforts by the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
Administrations, all of which formed the political backdrop to President
Nixon’s formulation of the self-determination policy.108 In his message to
Congress, President Nixon noted that the BIA had begun a policy of
contracting services to tribes for the operation of BIA programs.109 These
efforts quickly ran up against bureaucratic recalcitrance and a perceived
lack of legal authority.
For example, in 1970, the Miccosukee Tribe in southern Florida
presented a proposal to the BIA to contract for services provided by the
BIA's Miccosukee Agency, School, and related activities.110 The Associate
Solicitor for Indian Affairs initially declined the contract proposal based on
the view that the BIA lacked legal authority to enter into the contract with
the Tribe.111 After several rounds of negotiations among the Tribe, the
Solicitor's Office, and the Appropriations Committees of the House and
Senate, it was determined that the Tribe could create a private corporation
with which the BIA would have legal authority to contract for services.112
Nevertheless, at each turn in its negotiation with the BIA, the Miccosukee
Tribe was confronted with objections to the specific contents of its contract
proposal, “add[ing] up to an attitude on the part of the federal bureaucracy
that the existing laws were not designed to facilitate the purchase by the
Government from an Indian tribe of programs already being performed by
the Bureau.”113 In short, the experience of the Miccosukee Tribe
demonstrated that the BIA's efforts to move forward with selfdetermination were hampered by existing legal authority. Specific
legislation was necessary to bring to fruition the emerging concept of selfdetermination.
107. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-572 (1973) (enacted) (repealing the Act Terminating
Federal Supervision over the Property and Members of the Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973)).
108. CLARKIN, supra note 88, at 270–72.
109. NIXON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, supra note 94.
110. S. Bobo Dean, The Consent of the Governed—A New Concept in Indian Affairs?, 48
N.D. L. REV. 534, 542 (1971).
111. Id. at 542-46.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 546.
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2. Drafting the Bill
Despite the power-to-the-Indian-people rhetoric of President Nixon's
message, the initial self-determination legislation was drafted primarily by
federal bureaucrats with little input from Indian tribes.114 Perhaps for this
reason, the legislative proposal received “no noticeable support among
reservation Indians” and a cold reception from Congress.115
By 1972, Congress had its own legislation on the table. Senate Bill 3157
began with the following declaration: “[I]nasmuch as all government
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, maximum Indian
participation in the government of Indian people shall be a national
goal.”116 Though this bill was flawed and ultimately would not be
enacted,117 its grounding of tribal self-governance in the fundamental
democratic principle of “consent of the governed” would animate
succeeding legislation.
Five years after Nixon’s address, in 1975, Congress passed the
ISDEAA.118 The declaration of policy at the head of the statute articulates a
break with past policy while also recognizing the continuity of selfdetermination with the federal government's “unique and continuing
relationship to the Indian people”:
(a) The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United
States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people
for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation
in the direction of educational as well as other Federal services
to Indian communities so as to render such services more
responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.
(b) The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of
the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship
with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the
Indian people as a whole through the establishment of a
114. See, e.g., George S. Esber, Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination
Policy, in STATE AND RESERVATION, supra note 6, at 212, 214 (criticizing the Act as a “topdown decision”).
115. Dean, supra note 110, at 536.
116. S. 3157, 92d Cong. § 1(a)(1).
117. For example, there was no provision requiring the Secretary to turn over a program
upon tribal demand; any such transfer was to be “in his discretion.” Dean, supra note 110, at
541-42.
118. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–
450n, 455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)).
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meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit
an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs for
and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation
by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration
of those programs and services.119
Congress sought to accomplish these goals by giving Indian tribes and
tribal organizations the right to negotiate agreements with federal agencies
that have the funding for and responsibilities of operating programs that
benefit eligible American Indians and Alaska Natives.120 In effect, tribes
step into the shoes of the federal government by assuming the responsibility
for operating programs formerly provided by federal agencies.
After much debate in Congress,121 tribes walked away with their
principal objective obtained: the ability to identify the programs, services,
and funding they wanted to assume control over and administer through
contracts.122
3. An Overview of Self-Determination Contracts Under Title I
The intent of the contract theory was to allow tribes to build the capacity
to better perform essential governmental functions, as well as to improve
the programs by making them more responsive to local tribal needs. For
example, tribes operating a healthcare clinic through a self-determination
contract have more local control, knowledge of need, and flexibility to
better serve the healthcare needs of tribal members. Programs under local
tribal administration are more effective than those run by federal agencies
headquartered many miles away, and at the same time develop leadership
skills and administrative capacity.123
Since the Act’s passage in 1975, Title I contracts have provided one of
the primary mechanisms for Indian tribes to exercise their self119. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)-(b).
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775, 7776
(describing purpose of bill that became ISDEAA).
121. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600; Dean, supra note 110 (discussing the
differences between two legislative proposals in the Senate).
122. The Act allocated contracts determined by the Indian Priority System (IPS), nonbanded funds, and congressional appropriations. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at
1262-63. This was an important victory for the tribes. Id. In the early 1990s, the IPS was
replaced by the Tribal Budget System, which included the Tribal Priority Allocation (TPA)
to improve the process of allocating funds to tribes. Id. at 1264 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, THE INTERIOR BUDGET IN BRIEF FOR F.Y. 1996, at 128 (1995)).
123. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1).
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determination rights by helping tribes to build their governmental capacities
to serve the local needs of tribal members.124 However, full implementation
of the principles embodied in Title I has been very difficult to achieve
because both federal departments responsible for implementing the Act—
the DHHS and the DOI—proved, at best, to be reluctant partners of tribes.
Federal bureaucrats repeatedly used their discretion to thwart full
implementation of Congress's intent, leading to a series of amendments.125
As first enacted, section 106(a) of Public Law 93-638 provided that
contracts with tribal organizations were in accordance with federal
contracting laws and regulations, although the Secretary could waive
provisions in these laws and regulations which he determined were not
appropriate.126 Thus, self-determination contracts were essentially
procurement contracts administered by federal contracting officers. The Act
has since been amended to provide that federal contracting laws and
regulations do not apply to self-determination contracts unless such laws
expressly apply to Indian tribes,127 and to add a statutory model
agreement.128
Also, as first enacted, section 103(c) of Public Law 93-638 authorized
the Secretary to require any tribe requesting a contract to obtain adequate
liability insurance to protect the federal government. Congress subsequently
brought tribal contractors, compactors, and their employees within the
coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).129 Since tribal contractors
stepped into the shoes of the federal agencies, Congress reasoned, it would
not be fair to tribes or others to allow the agencies to use the selfdetermination process as means to divest themselves of potential liability.130
Title I gives all federally recognized Indian tribes and tribal
organizations, as defined in the Act,131 the right to contract for programs,
functions, services, and activities—along with associated funds and
124. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1263.
125. In 1987 the Senate condemned the “agencies' consistent failures over the past
decade to administer self-determination contracts in conformity with the law.” S. REP. NO.
100-274, at 37 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2656.
126. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93638, § 106(a), 88 Stat. 2203, 2210.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(a)(1).
128. Id. § 450l(c).
129. Id. § 450f(d); Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915,
1959), as amended by Act of Nov. 11, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-138, § 308, 107 Stat. 1379,
1416.
130. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 27-28, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2646-47.
131. 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e), (l).
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responsibilities—provided to Indians and Alaska Natives by the DOI or
DHHS.132 Once a contract proposal has been submitted, the statute imposes
a strict process and timeline to review the proposal.133 Section 102 of Title I
of the Act requires the Secretaries to enter into a contract, upon tribal
request, unless one of five narrowly defined statutory exceptions applies.134
This section also prescribes the appeal rights for participating tribes.135 If
the Secretary declines a tribe’s contract proposal, the Secretary must help
tribes overcome the obstacles that prompted the refusal and afford the tribe
a right to a hearing on the record.136 The Act also authorizes each Secretary
to award grants to help participating tribes develop the capability to operate
programs that they might eventually contract for under section 102.137 Once
a proposal has been approved, the agencies are required to negotiate and
award a contract and annual funding agreement (AFA)138 with the Indian
tribe or tribal organization within a certain timeframe139 calculated in
accordance with the Act.140
Title I contracts are unique government-to-government agreements that
differ significantly from other contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements
132. Id. § 450f(a)(1).
133. Id. § 450f(a)(2).
134. Id. The Secretary may only decline to enter into a proposed contract if:
(A) the service to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries of the particular
program or function to be contracted will not be satisfactory;
(B) adequate protection of trust resources is not assured;
(C) the proposed project or function to be contracted for cannot be properly
completed or maintained by the proposed contract;
(D) the amount of funds proposed under the contract is in excess of the
applicable funding level for the contract, as determined under section 450j-1(a)
of this title; or
(E) the program, function, service, or activity (or portion thereof) that is the
subject of the proposal is beyond the scope of programs, functions, services, or
activities covered under paragraph (1) because the proposal includes activities
that cannot lawfully be carried out by the contractor.
Id.
135. Id. § 450f(b).
136. Id.
137. See id. § 450(f)(b)(2).
138. See id. § 450l. The Act requires that two agreements be negotiated: a contract and an
AFA. The contract sets forth the general terms of the government-to-government
relationship that carry forward from year to year, while the AFA identifies on a yearly basis
the funds and responsibilities that the federal government transfers to the tribal contractor.
Id.
139. Id. § 450f(a)(2).
140. See id. § 450j-1.
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that the United States negotiates with other parties.141 Section 108 of the
Act sets forth a model agreement containing provisions that must be
included in all contracts.142 Congress included these mandatory provisions
in an attempt to strike a balance between promoting tribal selfdetermination while maintaining federal oversight over tribal contracts.143
In addition to the mandatory provisions, the contract can include any other
provisions agreed to by both parties.144
The model contract set forth in the Act protects the unique relationship
between tribes and the United States by ensuring that tribal sovereign
immunity is not affected by Title I contracts, and that the United States’
trust responsibility towards tribes is not terminated, waived, reduced, or
otherwise affected.145 Title I contracts must include a provision that requires
tribes that have assumed responsibilities over trust resources of individual
Indians to provide the same level of service that the United States would
have provided.146
Although the DOI and DHHS have general oversight over how tribes
carry out their responsibilities under Title I contracts, the Act limits agency
discretion to impose other burdensome requirements. For example, the only
reporting requirement that participating tribes are required to provide the
agencies is an annual audit.147 In limited circumstances, the DOI and DHHS
have the right to take unilateral steps to ensure contractors are carrying out
agreed-upon responsibilities. For example, the agencies have the right to
reassume any contracted program if there is a violation of rights or
endangerment to the health, safety, or welfare of any person, or if a
contactor mismanages trust funds or lands or interests in such lands.148 The
agencies also have the right to delay, suspend, or withhold contract
payments for a period of 30 days if a determination is made that the
141. See id. § 450j. The Act specifies that no “Federal contracting or cooperative
agreement laws (including regulations)” apply to Title I contracts “except to the extent that
such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes.” Id. § 450 j(a)(1).
142. Id. § 450l.
143. See S. REP. NO. 103-374, at 11-12 (1994) (discussing intent of model contract
reporting provision “to eliminate excessive and burdensome reporting requirements”).
144. 25 U.S.C. § 450l(a)(2).
145. See id. § 450n; see also id. § 450l(c)(d)(1).
146. Id. § 450l(c) (4).
147. See id. § 450c(f) note (referencing 31 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq.). However, the agencies
may seek to require additional reports if justified and required under the criteria set forth in
the statute. Id. § 450c(f)(2).
148. Id. § 450m; Contracts Under the Indian Self-Determination and Assistance Act, 25
C.F.R. §§ 900.240–.256 (2014).
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contractor has failed to carry out the contract without good cause.149 Where
unilateral actions are taken, contractors are entitled to appeal rights.150
Contracting tribes also have the right to propose a redesign of contracted
programs after they are awarded, to better suit unanticipated local needs.151
The statute requires the agencies to evaluate redesign proposals under the
same criteria as new contract proposals.152 Tribes also have the right to
reallocate awarded funds, provided the reallocation, “would not have an
adverse effect on the performance of the contract.”153
Tribes are treated as federal agencies for certain purposes when
performing responsibilities under a Title I contract including coverage
under the FTCA,154 the right to access excess and surplus federal
property,155 and the right to access federal sources of supply.156 These
provisions reflect the fact that Indian tribes and tribal organizations step
into the shoes of the federal government when they assume program
responsibilities under the ISDEAA.157 In contrast, some Title I contract
provisions reflect the distinction between Indian tribes and the United
States. For example, participating tribes have the right to impose tribal
employment preference laws when hiring personnel to carry out contracted
responsibilities.158 Tribal contractors are also exempt from the Davis-Bacon
Act, which requires most federal contractors to pay the locally prevailing
wage rate as determined by the Department of Labor.159
The Supreme Court has recognized that Title I contracts are as legally
binding as any other contract: “Congress, in respect to the binding nature of
a promise, meant to treat alike promises made under the Act and ordinary
contractual promises (say, those made in procurement contracts).”160 This
does not mean that ISDEAA contracts are ordinary procurement contracts,
as Congress made clear in exempting ISDEAA agreements from the
149. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(l).
150. Id. §§ 450m, 450j-1(f)(2); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.170–.176.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(j).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 450j-1(o).
154. Id. § 450f(c); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.180–.210.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(f); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.85–106.
156. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(f).
157. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 9 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2628
(“It must be emphasized that tribes are operating federal programs and carrying out federal
responsibilities when they operate self-determination contracts.”)
158. 25 U.S.C. § 450e(c).
159. Id. § 450e(a).
160. Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 639 (2005) (emphasis added).
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Federal Acquisition Regulations.161 Title I contracts are unique
government-to-government agreements in which “[]the federal
government's trust responsibility tempers all of the ordinary contract
rules . . . .”162
Title I contract provisions thus reflect a delicate balance between
competing sets of interests: the interest of tribes to pursue selfdetermination goals while ensuring that the United States' trust
responsibility remains intact, and the interest of the United States to pursue
a policy of tribal self-determination while retaining some control and
oversight over how responsibilities are carried out by tribal contractors.163
4. Title I Rulemaking
The process for developing regulations to fully flesh out and implement
the Act was a confusing and complex undertaking. As enacted in 1975, the
Act provided only minimal legal authority for the Secretary of the Interior
to develop rules.164 The first set of Title I regulations were rejected by the
Tribes as unworkable; the BIA and IHS retained far too much control over
tribal contracts and provision of services.165 Ironically, an early report by
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) concluded just the opposite—
that the United States retained inadequate controls over contracts and grants

161. See 25 U.S.C. § 450j(a)(1) (2012) (stating that contracts “shall not be subject to
Federal contracting or cooperative agreement laws (including any regulations), except to the
extent that such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes”); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 29,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2648 (stating the intent of amendment to § 450j(a) is that
“the system of federal acquisition regulations contained in Title 41 and Title 48 of the Code
of Federal Regulations shall not apply to Indian self-determination contracts”); see also 25
U.S.C. § 450b(j) (providing, in definition of “self-determination contract,” that “no
contract . . . shall be construed to be a procurement contract . . .”); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at
18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2637 (stating that the definition of “self-determination
contract” makes clear that “the system of federal acquisition regulations . . . should not
apply to self-determination contracts”); Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 640 (recognizing that
exemption from FAR is designed to reduce bureaucratic burdens on tribes).
162. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 36, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2655.
163. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 450a (declaring policy of tribal self-determination) with 25
U.S.C. § 450c (imposing reporting and audit requirements on tribal contractors).
164. See 25 U.S.C. § 450k.
165. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments, 61 Fed.
Reg. 32,482, 32,482 (June 24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 900 (2012)) (describing
“extremely critical” reaction of tribes to first draft of rules, completed without tribal input).
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awarded under the Act.166 These disparate responses illustrate the delicate
balance attempted by the Act.
The 1994 Amendments made several important changes to Title I167 in
response to earlier objections by participating tribes. Based on tribal and
Congressional reactions to the proposed regulations published in 1994, the
1994 Amendments added section 107(d)(2) to Title I of the Act.168 This
section requires that the rulemaking process follow the guidance of the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act,169 including requiring tribal representation in
the drafting and promulgation of the regulations.170 Any future revisions to
the regulations must also follow the guidance of the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act.171
After extensive negotiations, the tribal and federal teams reached
consensus on the language of the vast majority of the regulations, with the
DOI and DHHS Secretaries deciding four non-consensus issues.172 The
final rule implementing Title I regulations became effective on August 23,
1996.173
B. Title II: Education Assistance
Since the early days of the republic, the federal government has assumed
responsibility for educating Indians as part of its program of “civilizing”
tribes and their citizens.174 These Indian schools were infamous for
166. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-116394, STILL NO PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING CONTROLS OVER CONTRACTS AND GRANTS WITH INDIANS (1981). The report
criticized the BIA for not taking action recommended by GAO in 1978 to improve controls
over grants and contracts. The report concluded that contracts and grants should include
adequate criteria for measuring tribal performance, be submitted and approved before their
starting dates, and should be adequately supervised. Id.
167. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa–hh
(2012)); see discussion infra Part II.D.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 450k.
169. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2012)).
170. 25 U.S.C. § 450k(d).
171. Id. § 450k.
172. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments, 61 Fed.
Reg. 32,482, 32,483 (June 24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 900 (2012)).
173. Id. at 32,482.
174. See, e.g., Civilization Fund Act (Act of Mar. 3, 1819), ch. 85, 3 Stat. 516, 516
(establishing permanent “civilization fund” to provide “against the further decline and final
extinction of the Indian tribes . . . and for introducing among them the habits and arts of
civilization”).
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removing young children from their homes, cutting their hair, punishing
them for speaking their native languages, and generally attempting to “kill
the Indian . . . and save the man.”175 Most of the early schools were local
mission schools, but by the late nineteenth century the focus of Indian
education had shifted to federal boarding schools so that students could be
more completely removed from their home cultures and immersed in
“civilization.”176 Congress continues to recognize the federal trust
responsibility for the education of Native peoples, though the explicit
assimilationist goal of Indian education has been abandoned.177
In the 1960s, some tribes began to contract with the federal government
to manage BIA schools.178 Passage of the ISDEAA in 1975 accelerated the
trend toward self-determination in education, as did the Tribally Controlled
Schools Act of 1988 (TCSA).179 As Congress declared in the ISDEAA,
a major national goal of the United States is to provide the
quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities
which will permit Indian children to compete and excel in the
life areas of their choice, and to achieve the measure of selfdetermination essential to their social and economic wellbeing.180
Most of these services are now provided by tribes through ISDEAA
contracts and TCSA grants with the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE)
175. Richard H. Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites (1892), in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 18801900, at 261 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973). Captain Pratt was the founder of the Carlisle
Indian School in Pennsylvania.
176. COHEN, supra note 19, at 82. One court recently summarized “the legacy of the
federal government's involvement in Indian education” as follows:
The legacy is characterized by inadequate resource allocation, systematic
exclusion of Indian parents and communities from any role in the education of
their children, and a one-way transmission of white American education to the
Indian child as a means to remove the child from his aboriginal culture and
assimilate him into the white culture.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1066 (D.S.D. 2007).
177. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012) (declaring trust responsibility to fund BIA school
system); id. § 2501(b) (affirming trust responsibility for education, but disavowing “further
perpetuation of Federal bureaucratic domination of [education] programs”).
178. Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REV.
489, 507–12 (1973).
179. Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2511 (2012)).
180. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(c) (2012).
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within the DOI. As of September 2013, tribes and tribal organizations
directly managed 126 of the 183 schools (69%) in the BIE system.181 Tribal
colleges and universities are almost all managed by tribes.182 As
contemplated by the ISDEAA, tribes have taken control of the educational
process that will develop future leaders.
Tribes have demonstrated their capacity to offer more dynamic academic
programs than BIE has offered, with an emphasis on cultural education
through tribally-controlled schools. Yet, many obstacles still hinder
educational performance and have limited the positive impacts of the
ISDEAA in the Indian education arena. Among the challenges faced by
tribally-controlled education programs are (1) chronic underfunding of
Indian education programs and administrative support costs; (2) inadequate
investment to construct, reconstruct, and properly maintain tribal school
facilities; and (3) repeated BIE reorganizations and realignments that have
resulted in increasingly centralized BIE bureaucracy that has not fully
embraced the ISDEAA objective of increasing tribal control over
fundamental education policy decisions. Over the past few years, tribes
have contested the federal imposition of new, more detailed programmatic
requirements, performance assessments, and duplicative and burdensome
reporting requirements. A new dialogue with the Joint Department of
Interior and Department of Education Study Group on Indian Education
seeks to modernize and advance the self-determination framework for
Indian education to achieve high performing tribally-controlled schools.
C. Title III, Self-Governance, and the 1988 Amendments
The self-governance legislation in Title III had its roots in the 1975
ISDEAA and agency failure to carry out Congress's intentions in that
Act.183 As discussed above, Title I of the Act enabled participating tribes to
enter into contracts with the BIA and the IHS to administer and deliver
federal programs to Indian beneficiaries. By 1988, however, the
implementation of Title I had revealed significant shortcomings that
allowed federal agencies to exercise too much control while thwarting
tribes' ability to adapt programs to local needs. In 1988, a handful of tribes,
exasperated with the DOI's and the DHHS's failures to fully implement
Congress's self-determination policy in Title I, persuaded Congress to
address these problems in two ways: by significantly strengthening Title I
181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-774, INDIAN AFFAIRS: BETTER
MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED TO IMPROVE INDIAN EDUCATION 3-4 (2013).
182. Id. at 3.
183. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012).
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and by introducing the Self-Governance Demonstration Project under Title
III.184
In crafting the 1988 Amendments, Congress expressed its outrage at the
agencies’ implementation of the ISDEAA. While recognizing that “[t]he
federal policy of Indian self-determination is one of the most progressive
federal Indian policies in our Nation's history,”185 the Senate decried the
“agencies' consistent failures over the past decade to administer selfdetermination contracts in conformity with the law.”186 For example, the
Senate cited the growth of a “contract monitoring bureaucracy,”187 “unduly
burdensome reporting requirements,”188 the failure of the agencies to fully
fund indirect costs,189 end-runs around the statutory declination process,190
and other agency misbehavior. To address these issues, Congress made
several key amendments to Title I, including the addition of a new section
106 to clarify and protect contract funding levels191 and a new section 110
allowing contractors to seek injunctive relief and damages in federal district
courts.192
The 1988 Amendments not only shored up Title I, however. They also
introduced a new phase in the legal evolution toward tribal self-governance:
the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project under Title III.193 “Selfgovernance” refers both to the broad principle that tribes have the right to
govern themselves, and to particular statutory rights enabling them to do so
through the use of federal program funding. As a statutory initiative, selfgovernance (1) expands the types of programs and responsibilities that
participating tribes can take over; (2) places greater emphasis on
184. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2289 (1988), repealed by Tribal Self-Governance
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (2000) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)).
185. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 2 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2621.
186. Id. at 37, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2656.
187. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2626.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 8-12, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2627-31.
190. Id. at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2643.
191. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 205, 102
Stat. 2285, 2292-94 (1988); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 30-34, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2649-53.
192. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, § 206, 102 Stat. at 2294-95; S.
REP. NO. 100-274, at 34-36, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2653-55.
193. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, § 209, 102 Stat. at 2296-98
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (1988)), repealed by Tribal Self-Governance
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 10, 114 Stat. 711, 734.
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minimizing oversight by federal agencies; and (3) maximizes flexibility for
tribes to redesign programs and reallocate resources in their agreements.
The origins of Title III illustrate the interplay of the self-governance
philosophy and its legal mechanism in the ISDEAA.
1. Bureaucratic Problems, the Alliance of American Indian Leaders, and
the Constitution
One reason self-governance did not occur until the 1988 Amendments is
the bureaucratic stranglehold and monopoly that the federal agencies
retained over tribal administration of self-determination contracts under
Title I.194 Another reason is the lack of federal funding for tribal contractors'
administrative costs, a problem commonly known as contract support cost
shortfall.195 These bureaucratic problems, among others, spurred tribal
leaders to pursue congressional action that eventually led to Title III.
In 1986, Joe DeLaCruz, then President of the Quinault Nation, along
with leaders of nine other tribes, formed the Alliance of American Indian
Leaders (the Alliance).196 In 1987, the Alliance developed and submitted a
proposal to the United States House Interior and Related Agencies
Subcommittee on Appropriations. The proposal called on the United States
Congress to adopt concurrent resolutions that acknowledged the role that
Indian tribes played in the formulation of the United States Constitution,
and that formally recognized the principle of government-to-government
relations.197 Then, in the fall of 1987, the Arizona Republic published a
series of stories that would serve as a catalyst to forever change the

194. See S. REP. NO. 103-374, at 2 (1994) (describing 1988 amendments as response to
“excessive bureaucracy and unnecessary contract requirements”); see also Johnson &
Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1264–66 (describing the “byzantine bureaucratic burden on
contracting tribes” under Title I).
195. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2627 (“Perhaps
the single most serious problem with implementation of the Indian self-determination policy
has been the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service to provide
funding for the indirect costs associated with self-determination contracts.”); see also. S.
Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of
Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36 TULSA L. REV. 349 (2000).
196. The Alliance included the following tribal chairmen: Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault
Nation; Wendell Chino, Mescalero Apache Tribe; Roger Jordain, Red Lake Band of
Chippewa; Art Gambel, Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe; Larry Kinley, Lummi Nation; Willy
Colgrover, Hoopa Valley Tribe; Ed Landerman, Rosebud Sioux; Richard Realbird, Crow
Tribe; Ed Thomas, Tlingit and Haida Central Council; and Mickey Pablo, Confederated
Salish & Kootenai. LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 2.
197. Id.
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relationship between Indian tribes and the United States.198 The series dealt
with the misuse of funds and corruption within the BIA, which prompted
both chambers of Congress to call oversight hearings.199
The Alliance met in Washington, D.C. during the same week that the
hearing took place and some of the Alliance members attended the hearing.
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer proposed legislation
which would have allowed the BIA to transfer to any Indian tribe, upon the
tribe's request, its share of all BIA resources.200 As proposed by Assistant
Secretary Swimmer, the legislation would have contained a provision
absolving the United States of its trust responsibilities to any tribes that
accepted the transfer.201 The Alliance balked at the proposal and urged
Chairman Yates to reach a compromise through a demonstration project
that maintained self-governance without abolishing the United States' trust
responsibility.
2. The Demonstration Project
Chairman Yates liked the idea of a demonstration project, and in 1988
Congress amended the ISDEAA to authorize the Indian Self-Governance
Demonstration Project for five years.202 Nine of the ten tribes participating
in the Alliance were the first tribes to initiate the self-governance planning
process.203
The demonstration project authorized a planning grant phase for twenty
tribes, which would then go on to negotiate self-governance compacts with
the Secretary of the Interior.204 The hallmark of these agreements was the
unprecedented flexibility of tribal contractors to redesign programs and
reallocate funding to suit local needs.205 In effect, these tribes would receive
funds in the contractual equivalent of block grants from the Secretary.206

198. Chuck Cook, Mike Masterson & Mark N. Trahant, Fraud in Indian Country, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 4–11, 1987 (series of thirty articles).
199. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1267.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1267-68.
202. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 209, 102
Stat. 2289, 2296-98 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (1988)), repealed by Tribal SelfGovernance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 10, 114 Stat. 711, 734.
203. LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 8.
204. 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (2012).
205. Id. § 303(a)(2).
206. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 39 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2658
(referring to Title III agreements as “consolidated funding contracts”).
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In 1991, Congress extended Title III for an additional three years to
make up for BIA delays and amended Title III to include up to thirty tribes
in the demonstration project.207 In addition, Congress authorized a study to
include self-governance in the IHS.208 Congress included the IHS in the
Self-Governance Demonstration Project when it passed the Indian Health
Amendments of 1992.209
Title III is no longer in effect because Congress enacted Title IV in
1994,210 which created a permanent self-governance program for all bureaus
within the DOI, and in 2000, Congress added Title V, 211 which completely
repealed the demonstration project. In summary, after the 1994
Amendments Title III applied only to self-governance agreements between
participating tribes and the IHS, and the 2000 Amendments eliminated the
demonstration project by creating a permanent self-governance program
within the DHHS.
Title III's broad reprogramming and reallocation authority were
significant breakthroughs for tribal self-governance. The demonstration
project was a success because it delicately balanced the interest of tribes to
assume full responsibility over all available programs, functions, services,
and activities (PFSAs) and funding under the Act, with less federal
oversight after the PFSAs were assumed. However, because Title III was a
demonstration project, its provisions were very general, providing the
agencies with substantial discretion in implementing the statute. As
discussed below, the permanent self-governance programs under Titles IV
and V are more detailed and place more limits on the discretion of the
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
respectively. Under Title III, the IHS retained the right to decide which
tribes and how many tribes were eligible to participate in the demonstration
project.212 Once the IHS determined that a tribe was eligible, the IHS held
the right to decide whether it would sign an annual funding agreement with
207. Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-184,
105 Stat. 1278 (1991) (repealed 2000).
208. Id. § 6(d), 105 Stat. at 1278-79.
209. Indian Health Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, 106 Stat. 4526 (repealed
2000).
210. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat.
4250 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa–hh) (2012)); see discussion infra Part II.D.
211. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18) (2012)); see discussion infra Part II.E.
212. 25 U.S.C. § 450f (2012). In contrast, every federally recognized tribe and tribal
organization has the right to negotiate a self-determination contract under Title I. Id. §
450f(a)(1).
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the tribe and what provisions it would include.213 Even tribal
reprogramming and reallocation authority were “subject to the terms of the
written agreement,” giving the agencies significant control.214
D. Title IV and the 1994 Amendments
In 1994, Congress significantly amended the ISDEAA by enacting the
Tribal Self-Governance Act, also known as the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Act Amendments of 1994 (the 1994 Amendments).215 The
Tribal Self Governance Act represented a “step in the direction of
empowerment and away from paternalism . . . replac[ing] a stifling federal
bureaucracy with tribal governments focused on choices and
responsibility.”216 The 1994 Amendments revised a number of provisions in
Title I and included a new Title IV, which implemented a permanent Tribal
Self-Governance Program within the DOI.217 Title III, which was formerly
the Self-Governance Demonstration Project for both the IHS and the DOI,
became limited to only IHS programs.
1. Legislative History
By 1993, both the United States Congress and the tribes that participated
in the Title III demonstration project were ready to move forward with
legislation to make self-governance a permanent program.218 The
demonstration project was deemed a success, as the Senate Committee
noted:
Since 1988, Interior has conducted Self-Governance under
demonstration authority. The Self-Governance Demonstration
Project has had measurable success. It has achieved the goals it
set out to achieve—examining the benefits of allowing Tribes to
assume more control and responsibility over [PFSAs]. It has also
required [DOI] to enter into bilateral, negotiated agreements
governing the transfer of responsibilities and associated funding
213. Id. § 450f.
214. Id.
215. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, 108 Stat. 4250. The 1994
Amendments established a permanent tribal self-governance program within the Department
of the Interior (DOI), whereby the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and every other bureau in
the DOI that provides services to Indian tribes is authorized to transfer programs to
participating tribes and tribal organizations. Id.
216. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1251.
217. 25 U.S.C. § 458aa.
218. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1269.
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levels to Tribes and providing for streamlined management
processes that remove layer upon layer of bureaucratic
regulation and control. These agreements, known as SelfGovernance Compacts, are important binding agreements that
reflect
government-to-government
negotiations.
SelfGovernance encourages Tribal and Federal experimentation and
flexibility.219
However, the Senate Committee was also troubled “by the continuing
refusal of the [DOI] for the past four years to negotiate, on a line-by-line
basis with participating [tribes], tribal shares of [BIA] central offices funds
and resources despite clear directives to do so.”220
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Representative Bill Richardson (DN.M.) (then the Chairman of the United States House Subcommittee on
Native American Affairs) introduced legislation in the Senate and House,
respectively.221 Senator McCain's bill passed the Senate without a hearing
and, in early 1994, the House Subcommittee considered Congressman
Richardson's bill, House Bill 4842. At the eleventh hour of the 103rd
Congress, Congressman Richardson got House Bill 4842 through the
House, and the Senate passed the bill the following day. President Clinton
signed the 1994 Amendments into law on October 25, 1994. It is notable
that, over the years, legislative initiatives related to self-governance and the
development of policies of Tribal Self-Governance have typically enjoyed
broad bi-partisan support and relative stability.222
2. Amendments to Title I
In the 1994 Amendments, Congress also enacted a number of
amendments to Title I, attempting once again to force the DHHS and DOI
to implement self-determination as it was originally contemplated in
1975.223 For example, Congress significantly strengthened the declination
219. S. REP. NO. 103-205, at 5 (1993).
220. Id. at 9-10.
221. S. 1618, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 3508, 103d Cong. (1993).
222. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 6, at 16 (“[T]he survival of the U.S. federal policy of
Indian self-determination through self-governance over the last four decades is rooted in a
double appeal that it has for both the general electorate and their U.S. Congressional and
Executive Branch representatives.”).
223. The Senate Committee was troubled by, among other things, the “excess
bureaucracy and unnecessary contract requirements[]” undermining tribal self-determination
and -governance and the agencies' failure to promulgate workable regulations. S. REP. NO.
103-374, at 2-3 (1994).
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criteria and procedures, restricting the Secretary's ability to deny tribal
proposals.224 The 1994 Amendments also instituted the mandatory “model
agreement” in section 108,225 ensuring uniform inclusion of key contracting
rights of tribes.
3. Title IV and the Permanent Self-Governance Program in DOI
The Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Title II of the 1994
Amendments, reaffirmed that “the tribal right of self-government flows
from the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes and nations[.]”226 Congress
recognized the United States' “special government-to-government
relationship with Indian tribes, including the right of tribes to selfgovernance.”227 Congress sought to enhance tribal self-governance by
reducing federal bureaucratic control without abdicating the trust
responsibility.228
Title IV marked a break with Title I in several important respects. First, a
tribe has to establish eligibility by demonstrating financial stability and
financial management capability for the previous three fiscal years and
completing a planning phase.229 The tribe must then initiate negotiations for
a self-governance compact and annual funding agreement (AFA) with the
Secretary of the Interior.230 A self-governance compact is an executed
document that affirms the government-to-government relationship between
a self-governance tribe and the United States.231 A compact differs from an
AFA in various ways, including that parts of the compact apply to all
bureaus within the DOI, rather than a single bureau, and that it is generally

224. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, §
102(6), 108 Stat. 4250, 4251-52 (amending section 102(a) of the ISDEAA) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 450f(a) (2012)).
225. Id. § 103, 108 Stat. at 4260-68 (establishing new section 108 of the ISDEAA, 25
U.S.C. § 450l (2012)).
226. Id. § 202(1), 108 Stat. at 4271.
227. Id. § 202(2), 108 Stat. at 4271.
228. Id. §§ 202(3)–(4), 108 Stat. at 4271; id. § 203(4), 108 Stat. at 4271.
229. 25 U.S.C. § 458bb(c), (d) (2012).
230. Id. § 458cc. Grants are available for tribes to complete the planning and negotiation
phases. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 1000, subpart C (2014) (regulating section 402(d) of ISDEAA
regarding planning and negotiation grants); id. pt. 1000, subpart D (2000) (regulating
financial assistance for planning and negotiating grants for non-BIA programs).
231. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.161.
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negotiated to be perpetual in nature, not limited to any specific fiscal
year(s).232
Title IV does not contain a mandatory model agreement like that set
forth in section 108 for Title I contracts. The parties must negotiate all of
the terms of compacts and AFAs.233 As a result, provisions in compacts and
AFAs can vary and be less predictable. Because there are no explicit
declination appeal procedures in Title IV, tribes appear to have less
leverage to negotiate terms.234 However, section 403(l) gives a tribal
contractor the right to include in its Title IV compact or AFA any Title I
provision it wishes—including the declination procedures of section 102(a),
which limit the federal government’s discretion to deny proposals.235
Funding provided under Title IV agreements must be equal to the amount
the contractor would have been eligible to receive under Title I.236
Perhaps most significantly, Title IV expanded tribal contractors' rights to
redesign or consolidate PFSAs and to reallocate BIA funding. Title I allows
redesign and reallocation, but only if the Secretary is notified and does not
decline under section 102.237 Under Title IV, the Secretary does not have to
approve redesign unless it involves a waiver of a regulation.238 Nor does the
Secretary have to approve the reallocation of funds among programs that a
tribe administers under a single AFA.239 The 1994 Amendments also
require the Secretary to interpret laws and regulations “in a manner that will
facilitate the inclusion” of programs into agreements,240 similar to the
favorable Indian canons of construction.241

232. Id. § 1000.161. Appendix A of the Title IV regulations provides a model format for
self-governance compacts. See also 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(1) (2012).
233. See 25 U.S.C. 458cc(b).
234. But see Aleutian Pribilof Islands Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10
(D.D.C. 2008) (holding that BIA refusal to apply Title I declination criteria to Title IV
proposal was “arbitrary and capricious”).
235. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.84 (2000); see 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(l)(2012).
236. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.91(a)(1) (2014); see 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(g)(3)(2012). The Act
makes six sections of Title I mandatorily applicable to Title IV agreements. 25 U.S.C. §
458ff(c)(2012).
237. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(j) (2012).
238. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.88 (2014).
239. Id. §§ 1000.103, 1000.145. An exception to this general rule is that reallocation,
consolidation, or redesign of non-BIA programs of “special geographic, historical, or
cultural significance” are subject to secretarial approval. Id. § 1000.144 (2000).
240. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(i).
241. Cf. id. § 450l(c) (section 1(a)(2) of model agreement) (“Each provision of the
[ISDEAA] and each provision of this Contract shall be liberally construed for the benefit of
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4. Extension of Self-Governance Beyond BIA to Other DOI Programs
The 1994 Amendments offered not only greater program flexibility and
less federal oversight, but also an expanded scope of contractibility. The
Secretary of the Interior is required to annually publish in the Federal
Register a list of the non-BIA programs that are available for tribal
operation, and set programmatic targets for the number of signed
agreements each year in order “to encourage bureaus of the Department to
assure that a significant portion of such [PFSAs] are actually included” in
self-governance agreements.242 This provision is an important victory for
participating self-governance tribes because of the prospect of assuming
control of programs on the vast public lands that overlap or adjoin Indian
lands. Title IV authorizes non-BIA agencies to enter into agreements with
requesting tribes to transfer control of these lands, which were historically
under tribal control.243
Considering the vast amounts of formerly tribal lands administered by
non-BIA agencies within Interior, however, progress in developing Title IV
agreements with those agencies so far has been exceedingly slow. As of
2007, one researcher counted a total of only eighteen such agreements: one
with the Bureau of Land Management, seven with the Bureau of
Reclamation, two with the Fish and Wildlife Service, five with the National
Park Service, and three with the Office of the Special Trustee for American
Indians.244 The problem has been that the Department has interpreted nonBIA contracting provisions narrowly to leave most tribal proposals to the
discretion of the respective bureau.245
As interpreted by the DOI—and so far, by the courts as well—there are
two distinct vehicles for tribes to assume non-BIA programs: mandatory
inclusion under section 403(b)(2) and discretionary inclusion under section
403(c).246 Section 403(b)(2) states that funding agreements may include
PFSAs administered by the DOI, “other than through the Bureau of Indian
the Contractor . . . .”); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)
(stating that statutes for the benefit of Indians to be liberally interpreted in favor of tribes).
242. 25 U.S.C. § 458ee(c)(2).
243. See id. § 458cc(c) (authorizing inclusion in funding agreements of Interior programs
that “are of special geographic, historical, or cultural significance to the participating Indian
tribe”).
244. Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements Between Native
American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal SelfGovernance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 530 tbl. 2 (2007).
245. Id. at 477-78.
246. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(2); id. § 458cc(c).
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Affairs, that are otherwise available to Indian tribes or Indians[.]”247
Programs are “otherwise available,” in the Department's interpretation, if
they would be eligible to contract under Title I.248 This means that they
must be programs “for the benefit of Indians because of their status as
Indians” under section 102.249 Such programs must be included in Title IV
agreements upon tribal request.
Non-BIA programs that are not specifically targeted to Indians may still
be included in Title IV agreements under the discretionary authority in
section 403(c), which allows inclusion of PFSAs “administered by the
Secretary of the Interior which are of special geographic, historical, or
cultural significance to the participating Indian tribe requesting a
compact.”250 These programs, while benefiting a wider constituency than
Indians alone, may still be awarded on a non-competitive basis in a Title IV
agreement at the bureau's discretion.251
The Ninth Circuit upheld the DOI's two-tiered implementation of nonBIA compacting authority in Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan.252 The
Hoopa Valley Tribe sought to contract as a matter of right, first under Title
I and then under Title IV, various PFSAs carried out by the Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) under the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Management Act,253 as amended.254 The BOR ultimately determined that
two of the proposed PFSAs fell within the mandatory contracting authority,
but the other twenty-six did not, because they benefited all stakeholders in
the Trinity River and its fisheries, not the Tribe alone.255 The district court
upheld BOR's decision and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Trinity River
restoration program was not “specifically targeted” to Indians, but served

247. Id. § 458cc(b)(2).
248. See 25 C.F.R. § 1000.123–.124 (2014); see also 65 Fed. Reg. 78,688, 78,695 (Dec.
15, 2000) (explaining DOI interpretation as well as tribal position that programs “otherwise
available” include all PFSAs aside from inherent federal functions).
249. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)((E) (2012) (directing Secretary to approve, upon request,
proposal to assume “programs . . . for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians
without regard to the agency or office of the . . . Department of the Interior within which it is
performed”).
250. Id. § 458cc(c); see 25 C.F.R. § 1000.126 (2014) (defining “special geographic,
historical or cultural” significance).
251. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.128.
252. Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2005).
253. Act of Oct. 24, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-541, 98 Stat. 2721.
254. Hoopa Tribe, 415 F.3d at 989.
255. Id.
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local, state, and commercial interests.256 Therefore, the BOR restoration
projects (aside from the two identified by the BOR) were not “for the
benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians,” and thus were not
eligible for mandatory contracting under either Title I or Title IV.257 While
the Tribe was free to negotiate with the BOR to assume these other nineteen
activities under the discretionary 403(c) provision for programs of “special
geographic, historical, or cultural significance” to the Tribe, the BOR was
not required to assent.258
This narrow interpretation of Title IV non-BIA contracting authority,
which effectively gives the non-BIA bureaus unchecked discretion to deny
tribal proposals, is a significant problem to which we will return in Part
IV.C infra. Non-BIA bureaus within the Department tend to see their
constituency as national, not tribal, leading them to view Title IV “not as a
step in a long path toward Indian self-determination, but as an aberration in
public land policy and an intrusion into public land management.”259 These
non-BIA bureaus within the DOI will—as the Hoopa Tribe case
illustrates—defend their program and funding oversight with costly
litigation based upon their broad discretion, thus creating a chilling effect
for tribes that would even consider attempting to negotiate a Title IV
agreement with that agency.260 In order to carry out its stated goal of
expanding tribal self-governance throughout Interior, Congress should
strengthen Title IV's contracting authority for non-BIA programs.

256. Id. at 991.
257. Id. at 992 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)(E) (2012)).
258. Id. at 991 (relying heavily on its earlier decision in Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 325 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). In the earlier decision, the
Navajo Nation proposed a mandatory contract to administer the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) program, but the court held that TANF “is not a federal program
designed specifically to benefit Indians” under section 102(a)(1)(E), but rather one “that
collaterally benefit[s] Indians as a part of the broader population.” Navajo Nation, 325 F.3d
at 1138.
259. King, supra note 244, at 481 (referring to the National Park Service, but in our
experience the description could apply just as well to the other land management agencies
within DOI.).
260. See Hearing on S. 1715 and S. 1696 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th
Cong. 113-15 (2004) (testimony of Ben Stevens, Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments
(CATG) describing difficulties negotiating CATG’s agreement with U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service under current Title IV and advocating for amendments to facilitate agreements
between tribes and non-BIA agencies in DOI).
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E. Title V and the 2000 Amendments
The Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000261 made the selfgovernance demonstration project in Title III of the Act a permanent
program within the DHHS. The 2000 Amendments repealed Title III and
enacted two new titles, V and VI.262 Title V established a permanent selfgovernance program within the DHHS and Title VI authorized a study of
future inclusion of non-IHS agencies in the DHHS Self-Governance
Program.
1. Legislative History
Tribal efforts to seek the enactment of permanent self-governance
legislation on the DHHS side began in 1996 at the fall Self-Governance
Conference in Phoenix, Arizona. Tribal leaders and technical
representatives, in consultation with tribes, worked on drafting a bill that
tribes around the country could support. In June 1997, after the tribal draft
was completed, Representatives George Miller (D-Cal.) and Don Young
(R-Alaska) co-sponsored the bill's introduction as House Bill 1833 in the
United States House.263 On October 5, 1998, House Bill 1833 passed the
House. Following a hearing in the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
(SCIA), however, the bill was not scheduled for Senate floor action prior to
the adjournment of Congress.
In the next session, Representatives Miller and Young introduced House
Bill 1167 on March 17, 1999, which included all of the provisions that had
been worked out the year before. House Bill 1167 passed the House on
November 17, 1999. A Senate version of the bill, Senate Bill 979, was
introduced by Senators Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colo.) and McCain on
May 6, 1999.
The SCIA held a hearing on the bill on July 28, 1999, during which
Administration and tribal witnesses testified in strong support of the bill.264
On April 4, 2000, the Senate agreed to substitute language in Senate Bill
979 as proposed by the SCIA, incorporated that text into House Bill 1167 in
lieu of the House-passed language, and then passed the amended House Bill
1167. From early April until early July, tribal representatives, SCIA staff,
the House Resources Committee, the DHHS, and other administration
261. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa through 458aaa-18).
262. Id. §§ 4-5, 10, 114 Stat. at 713-32, 734.
263. No similar bill was introduced in the Senate.
264. Hearing on S. 979 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999).
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representatives worked hard to resolve all differences between the two bills.
By the middle of July, all of the differences between the two bills were
worked out and the compromise bill was enacted by the House and Senate.
On July 24, 2000, the House passed House Bill 562, which amended
House Bill 1167 to incorporate all the changes that were agreed to by the
SCIA and Resources Committee staff after Senate action in April. The
measure was then sent to the Senate, which, under unanimous consent,
approved and cleared the bill for the White House on July 27, 2000. On
August 18, 2000, the act was signed into law.265
2. Title V Innovations
Title V retains Title III's broad goal of strengthening tribal sovereignty
and the principle of Indian self-determination, while also promoting the
federal government's official policy of government-to-government
relationships with tribes.266 The provisions of Title V are much more
comprehensive than those in Title III, however, and were drafted to address
up front many of the problems that tribal leaders ran into as they sought full
implementation of Title IV.267
Title V operates in a manner similar to Title IV. Section 503 of the Act
permits each existing Title III tribe to participate in the permanent selfgovernance program under Title V instead.268 In addition to tribes and tribal
consortia transitioning from Title III to Title V, an additional fifty eligible
tribes per year are entitled to participate in Title V.269 Like Title IV, eligible
tribes are those that have completed a planning phase, requested entry into
the program, and demonstrated financial stability and financial management
capability for three years.270 However, Title V allows that evidence of the
absence of uncorrected significant and material audit exceptions in the
required annual audit is conclusive evidence of financial stability and
capability.271

265. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa-458aaa 18).
266. Id. § 3, 114 Stat. at 712 (declaration of policy) (included in 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa
notes).
267. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 979 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 264,
at 80 (statement of Henry Cagey, Lummi Indian Nation, describing Title IV as “skeletal
legislation” that proposed Title V would fill out).
268. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-2(a).
269. Id. § 458aaa-2(b)(1).
270. Id. § 458aaa-2(c).
271. Id. §458aaa-2(c)(2).
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Title V requires the Secretary of the DHHS to negotiate and enter into
funding agreements that authorize participating tribes to “plan, conduct,
consolidate, administer, and receive full tribal share funding,” including
IHS competitive grants for all PFSAs “that are carried out for the benefit of
Indians because of their status as Indians without regard to the agency or
office of the Indian Health Service within which the [PFSA] is
performed.”272 Title I also authorizes contracting for programs that are “for
the benefit of Indians,” but the scope of that term has given rise to
disagreements between the agency and the tribes.273 Under section 505(b),
the term refers to all IHS programs where “Indian tribes or Indians are
primary or significant beneficiaries.”274
Like Title IV (and unlike Title I) Title V contains no mandatory model
agreement. Nevertheless, both compacts and funding agreements are
required, and certain provisions must be included in the agreements. The
compact should include general terms of the government-to-government
relationship and terms that control from year to year.275 The funding
agreements must set forth terms generally identifying the PFSAs to be
performed, budget categories, funds to be provided (including those
provided on a recurring basis), time and transfer method of funds,
responsibilities of the Secretary, and other provisions as agreed.276 Either
the compact or funding agreement must include provisions relating to
health status reports, reassumption of PFSAs, final offers for compacts and
funding agreements and rejection thereof, negotiation in good faith,
expenditure of secretarial savings, prohibition on the Secretary’s
diminishment of the trust responsibility, and which agency officials are
responsible for “final agency action.”277
Title V significantly strengthens tribal rights in comparison with Title IV
in that it includes declination appeal procedures similar to Title I, limiting
the Secretary’s discretion not to enter into an agreement.278 Title V is
similar to Title IV in terms of negotiating annual funding agreements, but
Title V provides tribes with a right of “final offer” in compact and funding
agreement negotiations where the Secretary and participating tribe cannot
272. Id. §§ 458aaa-3(a), 458aaa-4(b)(1).
273. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 325 F.3d 1133 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc).
274. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4(b)(2).
275. Id. § 458aaa-3(a), (b).
276. Id. § 458aaa-4(d).
277. See id. § 458aaa-6(a).
278. See id. §§ 458aaa-6(b)-(d).
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agree on terms, including funding levels.279 Tribes must submit the final
offer to the Secretary, who has no more than forty-five days (or longer if
agreed to by the tribe) to make a determination on the offer.280 If the
Secretary does not properly or timely reject a final offer, it is deemed
approved as a matter of law.281 The Secretary's rejection of a final offer
must be contained in a written notification based on a finding that clearly
demonstrates, or is supported by controlling legal authority, that (1) the
funding level request exceeds what is due, (2) the requested PFSA is an
inherent federal function, (3) the tribe cannot carry out the requested PFSA
without creating a risk to public health, or (4) the tribe is ineligible to
participate in self-governance.282
The burden of proof on appeal of rejections of final offers is more
stringent than that in the Title I (and Title IV) declination process: The
Secretary has “the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence the validity of the grounds for rejecting the offer.”283 Title V also
provides that the tribe could instead proceed directly to federal district court
pursuant to section 110 of Title I.284 When the Secretary rejects a final
offer, the Secretary must agree to all severable portions that do not justify a
rejection and provide the tribe with an option to enter into a partial compact
or funding agreement, subject to any additional changes necessary to
conform the compact or funding agreement to the severed portions.285 A
tribe that enters into such a partial agreement retains the right to appeal the
Secretary's rejection.286
Reallocation and redesign authority under Title V is similar to that under
Title IV. Section 506(e) authorizes tribes to redesign or consolidate PFSAs
and reallocate or redirect funds for such PFSAs “in any manner which the
Indian tribe deems to be in the best interest of the health and welfare of the
Indian community being served,” so long as such action does not result in
denying eligibility for services to groups that would otherwise be eligible

279. See id. § 458aaa-6(b).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(1)(A); see id. § 458aaa(a)(4) (defining “Inherent federal
functions” as “those Federal functions which cannot legally be delegated to Indian tribes”).
283. Id. § 458aaa-6(d).
284. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(1)(C).
285. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(1)(D).
286. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(2).
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for service under federal law.287 The provision includes no secretarial right
to review.
The Title V legislation also made several very important amendments to
Title I of the ISDEAA. Section 6 of the 2000 amendments amended section
102(e)(1) of Title I to make clear that in any civil action under section 110
of the Act (federal district court actions), the Secretary has the burden of
proof to establish the validity of his grounds for declining a proposal.288
Section 7 amended section 105(k) of Title I to provide that tribes and
tribal organizations are “deemed an executive agency and part of the Indian
Health Service” for federal property acquisition purposes.289 This change
allows tribes and tribal organizations to use the Veterans Administration
Prime Vendor as a source of supplies. Section 105(k) was also amended to
require the Secretary to enter into acquisition agreements with tribes for
goods available to the General Service Administration (GSA) or other
federal agencies but previously unavailable to tribes, including acquisition
from prime vendors.290
Section 8 of the bill added a new section 105(o) to Title I,291 allowing
tribes to designate patient records as federal records in order to make those
records eligible for storage in Federal Records Centers. Finally, section 9 of
the bill reinstated section 106(c) of Title I,292 a provision requiring the
Secretaries of the DHHS and DOI to prepare and submit to Congress an
annual report on the implementation of the ISDEAA.
3. Title VI
The 2000 ISDEAA amendments also added Title VI, which directed the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the feasibility of
extending the tribal self-governance program to non-IHS agencies within
the DHHS.293 The Secretary was to consult with tribes and other
stakeholders and consider a number of factors, including effects on program
beneficiaries, statutory or regulatory impediments, likely costs or savings,
quality assurance and accountability measures, and others. In short, the
study was to determine whether Congress should authorize tribes to
287. Id. § 458aaa-5(e).
288. Id. § 450f(e)(1).
289. Id. § 450j(k).
290. Id.
291. Id. § 450j(o).
292. Id. §450j-1(c).
293. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 5, 114 Stat.
711, 731–732 (2000).
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compact non-IHS PFSAs, just as Title IV allows tribes to compact certain
non-BIA PFSAs within the DOI.294
Over the next few years, tribal representatives worked with the DHHS to
ensure that core self-governance principles—such as redesign and
reallocation authority—informed the feasibility study. In its final report to
Congress in 2003, the DHHS concluded that it was feasible to extend tribal
self-governance within the Department.295 The report listed eleven
programs from three non-IHS agencies that could be included initially296:
Administration on Aging
• Grants for Native Americans
Administration for Children and Families
• Tribal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
• Low Income Home Energy Assistance
• Community Services Block Grant
• Child Care and Development Fund
• Native Employment Works
• Head Start
• Child Welfare Services
• Promoting Safe and Stable Families
• Family Violence Prevention: Grants for Battered Women's Shelters
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)
• Targeted Capacity Expansion
Beneficiaries of these programs would likely benefit from their inclusion
in the demonstration project, the report concluded. Stakeholders, such as
state and local governments, did not oppose the demonstration project.297 A
number of statutes would need to be amended and regulations changed or
waived to give tribes the authority to assume—and redesign or
consolidate—the PFSAs and ensure program accountability.298 Based on its
294. See 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(2).
295. Office of the Ass't Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Feasibility Study at 8 (Mar. 2003).
296. Id. at 17.
297. Id. at 8-9.
298. Id. at 18 & app. E.
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cost-benefit analysis, the DHHS recommended moving forward with
legislation implementing the demonstration project.299
While tribes did not agree with every finding of the feasibility study,300
they strongly supported the idea of the demonstration project. Shortly after
the feasibility study was released, tribal representatives crafted draft
legislation that became the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project
for the DHHS.301 Introduced by Senators Campbell and Daniel Inouye (DHaw.) on October 1, 2003, Senate Bill 1696, the Department of Health and
Human Services Self-Governance Act of 2004, basically tracked the
recommendations of the DHHS feasibility study, while addressing some of
the tribal objections to the study.302
On May 19, 2004, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (SCIA) held a
hearing on Senate Bill 1696.303 Several tribal leaders and representatives

299. Id. at 12-21.
300. For example, tribes objected to the following provisions:
• Indirect Cost “Caps”: Eight of the eleven PFSAs proposed for inclusion in the
demonstration project imposed statutory or regulatory limits on administrative costs,
making it difficult if not impossible for tribes to fully recover their indirect costs
associated with those PFSAs. The study recommended that the administrative cost
caps be maintained, in order to keep down the costs of the demonstration project.
• Reallocation Ceiling of 20%: To maintain a baseline level of services for each PFSA,
the report recommended a “maintenance of effort” provision that would cap the
reprogramming of funding at 20% of the funds for a particular PFSA.
• Burden of Proof on Appeal: On appeals of final offers, and on decisions to withdraw
regulatory waivers, the report recommended that the burden of proof fall on the tribe,
and the Secretary's decision be reversed only if it is “arbitrary and capricious.” In Title
V, by contrast, the burden is on the Secretary to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the decision is correct.
301. S. 1996, 108th Cong. (2003).
302. See S. REP. 108-412, at 4 (2004) (stating that Committee on Indian Affairs agreed
with tribal recommendations following Feasibility Study, and that Committee “largely
adopted those recommendations in S. 1696”). For example, Senate Bill 1996 dropped the
proposed 20% cap on reallocation; instead, the bill allowed unlimited reallocation of funds
so long as their use met allowable cost standards established in Title V. S. 1696, § 2 (setting
forth reallocation authority in section 606(a)). For waivers and appeals, the bill placed a
heavy burden of proof on the Secretary to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence”
the validity of the agency decision. Id. (setting forth burden of proof in section
606(b)(4)(B)).
303. Hearing on S. 1715 and S. 1696 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong.
(2004).
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testified in strong support of the bill.304 Despite an invitation from the
Committee, however, no representative from the DHHS appeared at the
hearing.305 This absence was perplexing since the bill largely reflected the
agency's own recommendations from just one year before. While some
provisions departed from the DHHS recommendations, the provisions were
not unlike similar ones already existing in Title V.
On June 16, 2004, the SCIA favorably reported Senate Bill 1696 to the
full Senate and recommended passage. In its committee report on
November 16, 2004, the SCIA chronicled the success of the selfdetermination policy and described the extension of this success to other
programs beyond the BIA and IHS as “the next evolution in tribal selfgovernance.”306 With its goals of minimizing federal bureaucracy and
maximizing tribal authority in decision-making, Senate Bill 1696
“continues the steady march of meaningful tribal control of programs
affecting their communities.”307
Despite the favorable Senate report and strong support from tribes,
Senate Bill 1696 died at the end of the session. The Bush administration's
lack of support carried forward through a second term, with the DHHS
flatly refusing to participate in any discussion of the bill. Under its new
Chairman, Senator McCain, the SCIA shifted its legislative priorities, and
tribal leadership did the same. As discussed below in Part III.E., it is time
for serious and meaningful efforts to revive legislation implementing the
Title VI demonstration project.
IV. The Future of Self-Governance
The success of self-governance under the ISDEAA is reflected in the
remarkable growth of its programs over the years. In 1991, only seven
tribes entered self-governance agreements with the BIA, for a total amount
of slightly over $27 million.308 By Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, 254 tribes and
tribal consortia entered into 106 funding agreements, operating $432
million in programs, functions, services and activities.309 Approximately

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

S. REP. NO. 108-412, at 7 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE
INFORMATION, FY 2014, INDIAN AFFAIRS, at IA-TG-4 (n.d.), available at http://www.bia.
gov/cs/groups/xocfo/documents/text/idc1-021730.pdf.
309. S. REP. NO. 108-412, at 4.
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40% of all federally recognized Tribes are self-governance tribes under the
DOI program.
On the IHS side, in 1994 only fourteen tribes participated in selfgovernance agreements totaling $51 million.310 In FY 2015, according to
the IHS, eighty-nine compacts and 114 funding agreements will transfer
about $1.6 billion—over one-third of the IHS total appropriation—to tribes
and tribal organizations.311 Many of these compacts represent multiple
tribes—including the Alaska Tribal Health Compact, which includes
virtually all of the 228 tribes in Alaska—so well over half of the 566
federally recognized tribes participate in self-governance either directly or
through tribal organizations and consortia.312
Despite the resounding success of the self-governance program in
improving services and building tribal capacity, the growth documented
above has slowed to a crawl in the last few years. Part of this is the normal
flattening of the growth curve as the programs mature, but there are several
specific obstacles that could, and should, be removed to encourage further
participation in tribal self-governance. Among these are Congress's failure
to appropriate sufficient funds for contract support costs; continuing agency
resistance to the letter and spirit of the self-governance statutes; legislative
gaps and other problems in Title IV; and the restriction of self-governance
within the DHHS to IHS programs. In addition, opportunities exist to
expand self-governance beyond the DOI and DHHS to other federal
agencies, such as the Departments of Transportation, Agriculture, Justice,
and others.
A. Contract Support Costs
Carrying out federal programs requires that tribes develop and maintain
administrative capacity. As Congress recognizes, that takes money. The
ISDEAA commands that “[t]here shall be added to [program funding]
contract support costs which shall consist of an amount for the reasonable
costs for activities which must be carried on by a tribal organization as a
310. Office of Tribal Self-Governance, Indian Health Serv., FY 2007 Self-Governance
Data Table (n.d.) (on file with authors).
311. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2015 INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 138 (n.d.), available at http://
www.ihs.gov/budgetformulation/includes/themes/newihstheme/documents/FY2015Congressio
nalJustification.pdf.
312. Id. at 210 (listing Self-Governance Funded Compacts); see also Alaska Area,
INDIAN HEALTH SERV., http://www.ihs.gov/alaska/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (describing
Alaska Native health care system).
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contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract and prudent
management . . . .”313 If these administrative or overhead costs are not fully
paid, tribes must often re-direct program funds to cover these necessary
expenses, thus lowering the level of services provided (or at least funds
spent) below what the Secretary would have otherwise provided.314 This
creates a strong disincentive for tribes to contract or compact programs.315
In 1987, responding to “the overwhelming administrative problems
caused by indirect cost shortfalls,”316 Congress amended the ISDEAA by
adding a new section 106, which requires payment of full contract support
cost (CSC) funding.317 Unfortunately, over the ensuing fifteen years neither
the IHS nor the BIA paid the full amount tribal contractors needed, as the
agencies themselves acknowledged in CSC “shortfall reports” mandated by
the ISDEAA.318 In FY 2010, for example, the BIA paid on average only
75.17% of tribes' ongoing CSC needs,319 while IHS paid on average
81.5%.320 For larger contractors, this resulted in budget gaps in the millions
of dollars,321 while smaller contractors' shortfalls were equally devastating
proportionately.
Full funding is critical because of the devastating effects of CSC
shortfalls. By definition, CSCs are “the reasonable costs for activities
which must be carried on by a tribal organization as a contractor to ensure
compliance with the terms of the contract and prudent management.”322
These are fixed and unavoidable costs, such as insurance, property and
personnel management systems, audits, and facilities overhead and

313. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (2012).
314. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO RCED 99-150, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
ACT: SHORTFALLS IN INDIAN CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 5 (1999).
315. The fact that tribes continue to do so even in the face of persistent and deep contract
support cost shortfalls testifies to the broader social benefits of self-determination and selfgovernance beyond the specific programs themselves, including tribal capacity-building and
community empowerment.
316. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 12 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2631.
317. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1.
318. See id. § 450j-1(c).
319. BIA, Fiscal Year 2010 Contract Support Cost Shortfall Report (n.d.).
320. IHS, Fiscal Year 2011 Contract Support Cost Shortfall Report (n.d.) (on file with
authors) (2010 data). The agencies have different ways of designating the reports, with IHS
identifying both the year of submission and the (prior) year to which the data pertain.
321. Id. For example, the FY 2012 IHS report indicates that the Alaska Native Tribal
Health Consortium suffered a “Total FY 2011 CSC Deficiency” of $8,568,748 and the
Southcentral Foundation a CSC shortfall of $3,479,733.
322. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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maintenance. Faced with CSC shortfalls, tribes have limited options, none
of them good.
First, tribes can cut indirect costs. Cost reduction, however, can only go
so far before becoming counterproductive. At a certain point, administrative
infrastructure (personnel, computer systems, accounting systems)
deteriorates, reducing productivity and efficiency and jeopardizing contract
compliance.323
Tribes can also use program funding. Using direct program dollars to
cover CSC shortfalls reduces the resources available for already
underfunded and much-needed programs and services, in effect imposing a
financial penalty on tribes for exercising their right to self-determination.324
Alternatively, tribes can use tribal resources. Some tribes cover CSC
shortfalls with revenues from tribal businesses, trust funds, or other
resources. These resources could otherwise be used for economic
development, land acquisition, additional services, or other purposes.325
Forcing tribes to divert their own funds to administer federal programs not
only creates tangible harm, in the form of lost economic opportunities, but
it is unfair and inconsistent with how other government contractors are
treated. As a government contracting expert testified to the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs in 2004, it would be “unthinkable” for the
General Services Administration to suggest that IBM bear the indirect costs
of building computers for the government.326
Faced with these unappealing options, it is not surprising that some tribes
have opted to forgo self-determination and self-governance under the
ISDEAA altogether. The lack of full contract support funding has
323. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 314, at 39-40.
324. The Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation explained this dilemma to the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs:
The contract support cost problem has caused severe financial strains on the
Cherokee Nation's programs and facilities, as it has for many other tribes in the
country. What it means in real terms is that the Nation must reduce these
critical health, education and other programs to pay for these shortages.
Tribal Contract Support Cost Technical Amendments: Hearing on S. 2172 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 34 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 2172] (written
statement of Chad Smith).
325. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 8-9 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2627-28
(“Tribal funds derived from trust resources, which are needed for community and economic
development, must instead be diverted to pay for the indirect costs associated with programs
that are a federal responsibility.”).
326. Hearing on S. 2172, supra note 324, at 20 (statement of Herbert Fenster (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7).
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undoubtedly played a significant role in the leveling off of participation in
self-determination and self-governance in recent years. In 2006, the DOI's
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs noted the relatively
flat rate of participation in self-governance, and told Congress that “tribes
have indicated that they would increase their overall participation if the
issue of contract support cost funding was resolved.” 327
CSC funding has spawned long and intensive litigation against both the
BIA and IHS, including two United States Supreme Court decisions. In
2005, the Supreme Court ruled, in Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt,328 that IHS
was liable for failing to pay full CSC in years before Congress began
“capping” CSC spending—that is, identifying a specific amount IHS was
“not to exceed.”329 In the absence of a statutory restriction, the Court held,
IHS's entire lump-sum appropriation was legally available to reallocate to
fully pay CSC needs.330 The Court noted that the Act uses the word
“contract” 426 times, and concluded that contracts with tribes are as
binding as with any other government contractor.331
Cherokee left unresolved the question of government liability during
years when there were statutory restrictions—the so-called “cap years.” For
several years, the lower courts and appeals boards held unanimously that
the caps protected the government from liability. The ISDEAA makes all
funding, including for CSC, “subject to the availability of
appropriations.”332 The caps limited the amount of CSC available, the
reasoning went, so the agency could not be faulted if it spent no more. This
reasoning prevailed in the Federal Circuit's 2010 decision in the Arctic
327. Obstacles and Impediments to Expansion of Self-Governance: Oversight Hearing on
Tribal Self-Governance Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 129 (2006)
(statement of George T. Skibine); see also Contract Support Costs Within the Indian Health
Service Annual Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 14 (1999)
(statement of Kevin Gover, Ass’t Secrectary for Indian Affairs, that “[t]he first step” toward
expanding self-governance “is definitely 100 percent funding of contract support”); NIHB
REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (showing that 27% of IHS direct service tribes, and 28% of Title
I contracting tribes, viewed lack of contract support funding as a barrier to contracting and
compacting).
328. 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
329. Id. at 634-35. Congress began capping CSC appropriations for BIA in FY 1994,
and for IHS in FY 1998. E.g., Dep't of the Interior & Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-83, 111 Stat. 1543, 1582-83 (1997) (providing that, in FY 1998, “not to
exceed $168,702,000 shall be for payments to tribes and tribal organizations for contract
support costs associated with ongoing contracts or grants or compacts” with IHS).
330. Leavitt, 543 U.S. at 647.
331. Id. at 639, 644.
332. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b) (2012).
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Slope case, after which the prospects of cap-year CSC claims appeared
bleak.333 Less than a year later, however, the Tenth Circuit in Ramah
Navajo Chapter v. Salazar held that the caps limit the aggregate amount the
BIA may distribute, but do not excuse underpayment of any single
contractor's full CSC as long as the appropriation is enough to cover that
individual contract.334 That decision created a split among the federal
appeals courts, and the Supreme Court granted the government's petition to
review the Ramah decision and resolve the conflict.
The Ramah case was—and remains, as of this writing—a long-running
CSC class action on behalf of tribes and tribal organizations that contract or
compact with the BIA or the Office of Self-Governance within the DOI.
The portion of the case before the Supreme Court in 2012 involved CSC
shortfall claims for cap years 1994 through 2001. In a 5-4 decision, the
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit.335 The majority opinion—authored by
Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Kagan—began by summarizing the Cherokee decision and stressing that
ISDEAA contracts are as binding as any other contracts.336 Under
government contracting law, the rule has long been that if an appropriation
is sufficient to pay a contractor in full, the fact that the government expends
the appropriation on other permissible purposes (including other contracts)
does not excuse the government from paying the contractor in full.337 This
rule, which derives from an 1892 Court of Claims case, Ferris v. United
States, protects both the contractor and the United States by ensuring
government contracting is not overly risky and hence expensive.338
Applying this rule, the majority noted that the annual CSC appropriation of
between $91 million and $125 million far exceeded the amount due to any
single contractor, including Ramah.339 Because the BIA had discretion over
how to distribute this amount, the agency could have paid Ramah its full
CSC need, even though that would have meant paying another contractor

333. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, 133
S. Ct. 22 (2012).
334. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2011), aff’d, Salazar v.
Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).
335. Salazar, 132 S. Ct. at 2195.
336. Id. at 2188.
337. Id. at 2189.
338. Id. at 2189-90.
339. Id. at 2190.
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less.340 Thus, the Court concluded, the BIA could not avoid the contractual
promise to pay Ramah's CSC in full.341
The Ramah decision applied directly only to the BIA, but after that
decision, the Court vacated a contrary Federal Circuit decision involving
IHS and the Arctic Slope Native Association.342 On remand, the Federal
Circuit followed Ramah, noting that the IHS's appropriations cap language
was nearly identical to the BIA’s, and holding that the IHS too was
obligated to pay the tribal contractor's full CSC.343 With liability for pastyear shortfalls established, tribal contractors anticipated expeditious
settlements of both the Ramah class action against the BIA and the many
individual claims against the IHS, but those expectations were mistaken.344
No settlement has been reached in the Ramah case nearly two years after
the Supreme Court’s decision, and settlements of IHS claims have been few
and far between.345 The Supreme Court did not offer any guidance as to
what “full” CSC means, and the parties took divergent views that proved
difficult to reconcile. In early 2014, however, settlements began to
accelerate, some for substantial amounts such as $25 million, $25.5 million,
and $52 million.346

340. Id.
341. Id. at 2191. In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Alito) argued that two “unambiguous restrictions” limited available funding and thus
precluded liability. First, the appropriations caps limited the total amount BIA could pay in
each year. Second, the ISDEAA “reduction clause” says that BIA “is not required to reduce
funding for programs, projects, or activities serving a tribe to make funds available to
another tribe or tribal organization.” 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b) (2012). The cap prevented BIA
from reprogramming funds from outside the CSC appropriation to cover the shortfalls, while
the reduction clause prevented BIA from shifting funds within the appropriation from one
tribe to cover the shortfall of another. Unlike in Cherokee Nation, there were no unrestricted
funds, and unlike in Ferris, funds available to one contractor were not legally available to
another. Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts and the other dissenters would have held that tribes
are not entitled to full CSC.
342. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012), vacating 629 F.3d
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
343. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 501 Fed. Appx. 957, 959 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
344. See Kimberly Kindy, Federal Contractors on Edge as Indian Tribes Wait for Claims,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-contractors-onedge-as-indian-tribes-wait-for-claims/2013/12/22/5662fe28-5c3e-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_
story.html.
345. Id. (noting that less than 1% of claims had been settled as of December 2013).
346. See Judgment Fund Payment Search, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, https://jfund.fms.treas.
gov/jfradSearchWeb/JFPymtSearchAction.do (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/1

No. 1] HISTORY, STATUS & FUTURE OF SELF-GOVERNANCE

55

While a resounding victory for tribes, the Ramah decision nonetheless
did not ensure full CSC funding moving forward. The Court concluded its
opinion by noting that Congress had given the BIA (and IHS) conflicting
statutory mandates.347 The ISDEAA requires the BIA to pay full CSC to all
contractors, yet in every year at issue Congress failed to appropriate enough
for the BIA to do so.348 The Court offered several suggestions to Congress
should it wish to resolve this dilemma, including amending the ISDEAA to
allow payment of less than full CSC, placing a moratorium on new
contracts, making line-item CSC appropriations for every ISDEAA
contract, or appropriating enough CSC funding.349 Early in the FY 2014
budget process, the Obama Administration adopted one of the Court’s
“solutions” and proposed to incorporate by reference into the
Appropriations Act funding tables developed by the BIA and IHS that
would identify a specific amount of CSC available for each contract.350 This
would have created, in effect, line-item appropriations placing every
contractor on notice of the amount of CSC available, arguably defeating the
Ferris rule and avoiding government liability for CSC shortfalls. This
proposal to circumvent the Ramah ruling provoked an immediate firestorm
of outrage not only from Indian country, but from other government
contractors.351 The United States Chamber of Commerce and the National
Defense Industrial Association had filed a Supreme Court amicus brief in
the Ramah case arguing that a ruling for the Government would have
“enormous destabilizing effects on the government contracting

347. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2195 (2012).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See Letter from Dr. Yvette Roubideaux, Director, HIS, to Tribal Leaders (June 12,
2013) (describing Administration’s reasoning in adopting proposal based on Supreme
Court’s options in Ramah opinion) (on file with authors).
351. See, e.g., Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, Resolution #REN-13-015: Request That the
Administration Resolve Contract Support Costs Claims, Withdraw Its Proposal to Limit
Contract Support Costs in Its FY 2014 Budget, and Support Full Contract Support Cost
Funding (2013), available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_vMSQbplUjZzuadF
LeexAJarvOvfJQXBdnGcYMEqgSUbRpxojiFv_REN-13-015%20final.pdf; Letter from U.S.
Chamber of Commerce to Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
(Oct. 9, 2013) (on file with authors).
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community.”352 The proposal was also met with strong opposition from
many in Congress.353
In the end, Congress did not adopt the “mini-cap” proposal; instead, the
Appropriations Act contained no caps at all, either on individual contracts
or aggregate CSC spending.354 This restored the statutory landscape to that
the Supreme Court delineated in Cherokee Nation: with no statutory
restriction on CSC spending, the agencies’ entire lump-sum appropriations
were available to pay CSC in full.355 Having no legal basis to do otherwise,
IHS and the BIA announced their intentions to pay full CSC in FY 2014
and again in FY 2015.356 As stated in the BIA’s FY 2015 budget
justification to Congress: “Full funding for CSC ensures tribes have
sufficient resources to oversee program implementation and allows tribes to
deliver services more effectively. Full funding for tribal administration of
programs is a key element of the Administration’s commitment to support
tribal self-governance.”357
For the moment, then, the struggle has shifted from whether to pay full
CSC to how much constitutes full payment and how to resolve CSC issues
moving forward. Following a directive from Congress in the Explanatory
Statement accompanying the FY 2014 Appropriations Act,358 the BIA and
IHS initiated a joint consultation with tribes “to formulate long-term
accounting, budget, and legislative strategies that will yield solutions going
forward.”359 As of this writing, these strategies are still being formulated
352. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici
Curae Supporting of Respondents at 6, Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181
(2012) (No. 11-551).
353. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Mark Begich et al. to Sylvia Mathews Burwell (Sept. 30,
2013) (on file with authors). In this letter, a bipartisan group of eleven senators wrote to
OMB Director Sylvia Mathews Burwell calling the mini-caps proposal “short-sighted and
ill-timed” and urging the Administration to withdraw it. Id.
354. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5.
355. See Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 641-42 (2005).
356. Kimberly Kindy, U.S. Agrees to Fully Fund 2014 Service Contracts with Indian
Tribes, Lawmakers Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/us-agrees-to-fully-fund-2014-service-contracts-with-indian-tribes-lawmakers-say/2014/
02/13/5f2f3cd6-94bc-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story/html.
357. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE
INFORMATION, FISCAL YEAR 2015: INDIAN AFFAIRS at IA-ES-1 (n.d.), available at http://
www.doi.gov/budget/upload/FY2015_IA_Greenbook.pdf.
358. See 160 CONG. REC. H475, H975 (Jan. 15, 2014).
359. Letter to Tribal Leaders from Dr. Yvette Roubideaux, Director, IHA, and Kevin
Washburn, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Indian Affairs (Feb. 12, 2014) (on file with
authors).
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and the mechanics of full funding are still being developed and refined.
Tribes are assured of full CSC funding only through FY 2015. Given the
agencies’ historical and continuing resistance to tribal self-governance (as
discussed next), it would not be surprising to see the re-emergence of the
line-item mini-caps or some other proposal to circumvent or subvert the
right to full CSC.
B. Implementation Issues: Continuing Agency Resistance to SelfGovernance
CSC funding has hardly been the only issue creating tension between
tribes and federal agencies. If there is anything that tribes—and Congress—
have learned over the years, it is that the DOI and DHHS can be counted on
to resist tribal self-governance, because it requires the transfer of program
authority and associated funding from the federal bureaucracy to tribal
control.360 While the agencies have made some progress in acknowledging
tribes' statutory rights to self-governance, often they continue to interpret
and implement the statutes as narrowly as possible, in contravention of the
ISDEAA's mandate that the statute and the contracts be interpreted liberally
for the benefit of tribes and in favor of transferring programs and funding to
tribes.361
Recently both IHS and the BIA have taken legal positions directly
contrary not only to tribal interests, but also to clear statutory language. For
example, in Susanville Indian Rancheria v. Leavitt,362 IHS rejected the
Tribe's final offer under Title V because the Tribe proposed to charge
360. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 37 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620,
2656 (“The strong remedies provided in [the 1988] amendments are required because of
[BIA's and IHS's] consistent failures over the past decade to administer self-determination
contracts in conformity with the law”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-477, at 34-35 (1999), reprinted in
2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 573, 592 (“Because the Act requires the agencies to divest themselves of
programs, staff, and funding at tribal request, the courts should not give Administrative
Procedure Act-type deference to agency decisionmaking.”).
361. See 25 U.S.C. § 450l(c) (2012) (section 1(a)(2) of model agreement) (“Each
provision of the [ISDEAA] and each provision of this Contract shall be liberally construed
for the benefit of the Contractor to transfer the funding and following related
[PFSAs] . . . .”); id. § 458aaa-11(f) (“Each provision of this part and each provision of a
compact or funding agreement shall be liberally construed for the benefit of the Indian tribe
participating in self-governance and any ambiguity shall be resolved in favor of the Indian
tribe.”); id. § 458aaa-11(a) (requiring Secretary to interpret all federal laws, executive
orders, and regulations in a manner that will facilitate inclusion of PFSAs into Title V
agreements, implementation of compacts and funding agreements, and achievement of tribal
health goals and objectives).
362. No. 2:07-cv-259-GEB-DAD, 2008 WL 58951 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2008).
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pharmacy service beneficiaries a small co-pay. IHS provided no funding for
pharmacy services, and the Tribe determined that without the user fees, the
Tribe would be unable to provide such services at all. IHS took the position
that the Tribe could not charge beneficiaries because the agency itself
cannot do so, despite the plain language of the controlling Title V
provision: “The Indian Health Service under this sub-chapter shall neither
bill nor charge those Indians who may have the economic means to pay for
services, nor require any Indian tribe to do so.”363 The court held that this
provision clearly did not prevent the Tribe from charging; it prevented IHS
from requiring the Tribe to charge.364 Remarkably, IHS argued that if the
court found the statute ambiguous, it must defer to IHS's interpretation
under the common-law Chevron doctrine,365 despite the statutory rule of
construction that ambiguities be resolved in favor of tribes.366 The court
found no ambiguity, however.367
The DOI, too, has abused the declination process and even attempted to
circumvent it altogether. In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne,368
the BIA declined the Tribe's contract proposal to run a school, but the
cursory declination letter merely cited three declination criteria without
including specific findings demonstrating that the criteria were met.369 The
letter did not include a detailed explanation of the decision, nor did it
include the documents the agency relied on in making that decision.370 The
court ruled the declination deficient, holding that the Secretary's burden of
proof requires that he clearly demonstrate, through a detailed explanation
with specific findings, that a declination decision is justified.371 Because the
BIA failed to comply with the declination statute and regulations, the court
did not find it necessary to address the merits of the BIA's decision, and
held the contract deemed approved by operation of law.372

363. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-14(c) (emphasis added).
364. Susanville, 2008 WL 58951 at *7.
365. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (holding that when a statute is ambiguous, courts must generally defer to the
reasonable interpretations of the federal agency charged with administering the statute).
366. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-11(f) (2012).
367. Susanville, 2008 WL 58951 at *7.
368. 496 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D.S.D. 2007).
369. Id. at 1064-65.
370. Id. at 1065.
371. Id. at 1067-68.
372. Id.
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The IHS suffered a similar fate when it failed to comply with the “final
offer” procedures under Title V.373 The Maniilaq Association, an Alaska
Tribal Organization, proposed to incorporate into its funding agreement a
lease of a health clinic in the Native Village of Ambler.374 The IHS did not
respond within the statutorily required fourty-five days, and when it did, it
argued that the proposal was not a proper final offer because leases cannot
be included in funding agreements.375 The court rejected IHS’s narrow
interpretation of the ISDEAA and held that the final offer was valid and
deemed approved as a matter of law.376
The BIA went a step further in Aleutian Pribilof Islands Ass'n v.
Kempthorne377 by attempting to deny the tribal contractor's appeal rights
altogether. For many years, the Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association
(APIA), a nonprofit consortium of Alaska tribes, had performed certain
cultural heritage resource preservation activities under its Title IV
agreement. In 2005, the BIA decided that the proper beneficiary of the
cultural heritage program was the regional for-profit corporation, The Aleut
Corporation (TAC), not the thirteen federally recognized tribes represented
by the APIA.378 BIA simply removed the funds from the APIA's agreement
with no written explanation of its decision and without notifying APIA of
its right to appeal or how to do so.379 The BIA argued that the declination
procedures and criteria were not triggered, because the APIA was not the
“primary beneficiary” of the program.380 The court rejected this argument,
holding that the BIA's attempted end-run around the declination criteria was
“arbitrary and capricious.”381
373. See 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-6(b) & (c).
374. Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, Civ. Action No. 13-cv-380 (TFH), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117084 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014). The clinic is one of the facilities operated by
Maniilaq under the Village Built Clinic program, which IHS has chronically underfunded for
years. Maniilaq proposed a lease under the authority of the ISDEAA, 25 U.S.C. § 450j(l), a
Title I provision incorporated into the Alaska Tribal Health Compact as well as Title V. See
id. § 458aaa-15(a).
375. Burwell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117084, at *7-*8.
376. Id. at *33. The court discussed the canon of construction favoring tribes—which is
incorporated into Title V at 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-11(f)—is support of its conclusion that
“Congress intended the ISDEAA to be implemented in a manner favoring flexibility in
funding agreements like the one at issue in this case.” Id. at *12.
377. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008).
378. Id. at 5.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 10.
381. Id. at 12; cf. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 24 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2620, 2643 (condemning agency “threshold” arguments for avoiding declination criteria, and
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While the APIA case turned on Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
claims—making it unnecessary for the court to reach APIA’s ISDEAA
claims—typically the standard of review in declination cases is not the
same as the deferential APA standard, which requires the plaintiff to show
that the agency's decision is “arbitrary, capricious . . . or . . . not in
accordance with law.”382 This deferential standard of review imposes a
heavy burden of proof on the party challenging agency action.383 In
contrast, the ISDEAA imposes a heavy burden of proof on the agency to
justify its declination decisions, providing that the Secretary “shall have the
burden of proof to establish by clearly demonstrating the validity of the
grounds for declining the contract proposal (or portion thereof).”384
The ISDEAA does not require the agencies to fund proposals to run
programs they had not previously run themselves.385 But in Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe v. Burwell,386 the IHS declined the Tribe’s proposal to assume
operation of an Emergency Medical Services program that the agency had
been funding for almost twenty years. The IHS determined it did not want
to fund the program going forward, so the applicable funding level was $0,
and the Tribe asked for more than that, allowing IHS to decline.387 The
court held, however, that the applicable funding level is determined at the
time of the proposal, and IHS could not subsequently cancel the program
and avoid the requirements of the ISDEAA.388
The examples above—which could be multiplied389—illustrate the
agencies' continuing efforts to frustrate tribal rights to self-determination
and self-governance seemingly inscribed clearly in the ISDEAA. To
advance the cause of tribal self-governance, the statutes need to be
stating intent that denials of tribal proposals be “handled only through the declination
process”).
382. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
383. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
384. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(e) (2012).
385. Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.
2013).
386. No. 1:13-cv-01771 (CRC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142386 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2014).
387. Id. at *17; 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2)(D).
388. Id. at *18.
389. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. United
States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. July 27, 2009) (rejecting IHS attempt to make decision
declining contract support cost funding unreviewable through Rule 19 argument); see also
infra notes 408-11 and accompanying text (discussing recent DOI and DHHS efforts to
remove “477 program” funding from self-governance agreements so agencies could assert
more direct control).
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strengthened and improved, beginning with Title IV, the DOI SelfGovernance law.
C. Title IV Amendments
After Title IV was enacted in 1994, there followed a long and
contentious negotiated rulemaking process, during which numerous gaps
and shortcomings in Title IV became apparent. In 2000, the same year the
Title IV regulations were finalized, Congress enacted Title V, the DHHS
version of Self-Governance.390
It soon became apparent that Title V worked much better than Title IV.
Having learned from the problems experienced by tribes—and by the
federal government—in implementing Title IV agreements, Congress in
Title V filled many of the gaps and corrected many of the problems in Title
IV. Tribal leaders determined that Title IV should be amended to address
these issues and to conform to Title V.
Tribal and federal leaders thus began a process to amend Title IV, which
remains incomplete as of this writing. Tribal representatives engaged in
ongoing discussions of draft Title IV legislation with representatives from
the BIA and other DOI personnel. In 2003, a bill was introduced and
favorably reported by the SCIA, but never made it out of the Committee.391
In 2006, the SCIA again considered comprehensive Title IV
amendments,392 but again the initiative died at the end of the session.
The tribal-federal workgroup continued its negotiations, and in October,
2007, House Bill 3994 was introduced. The DOI continued to resist certain
key provisions, however—for example, one allowing tribes to assume, as of
right, non-BIA PFSAs. In a last-ditch effort to secure passage of the bill in
2008, tribes agreed to delete this provision and made other concessions.
Nonetheless, this bill also ran out of steam as the congressional term and
the Bush administration wound down.
After the Obama administration took office, self-governance Tribes
reinitiated dialogue with House and Senate staff on legislation to amend
Title IV. A major effort was again made to amend Title IV with the
“Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2010,” which
390. See 65 Fed. Reg. 78688 (Dec. 15, 2000) (final Title IV regulations, codified at 25
C.F.R. pt. 1000).
391. See S. REP. NO. 108-413 (2004); Dep’t of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of
2003, S. 1715, 108th Cong. (2004).
392. See Obstacles and Impediments to Expansion of Self-Governance: Oversight
Hearing on Tribal Self-Governance Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong.
(2006).
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was introduced in the House as House Bill 4347 and passed the House on
September 22, 2010.393 House Bill 4347 was received in the Senate, and
referred to the SCIA, but was met with Departmental opposition in a
hearing on November 18, 2010, and failed to move further toward
enactment.394 House Bill 4347 would have made several amendments to
Title I, including providing a clearer definition of “self-determination
contract”; adding a requirement for liberal construction of contractual
ambiguities resolved in favor of the tribal contractor; and inserting a
provision for additional allowability of costs for tribal governing bodies.395
House Bill 4347 included substantial amendments to Title IV as well. It
sought to reduce the Secretary’s discretion to deny tribal assumption of
PFSAs in non-BIA DOI agencies; bring the “final offer” timeline and
burden of proof standard in declinations in line with those provided in Title
V; clarify how the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides coverage
under the ISDEAA; add a wide range of construction/facilities provisions,
including additional tribal capacity to further assume federal responsibilities
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); and clarify the Secretary’s capacity to
repeal any regulation inconsistent with the provisions of the bill.396 A
similar bill to House Bill 4347 was introduced the following session as
House Bill 2444, “Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act
of 2011,” but it failed to leave the Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska
Native Affairs. Follow-up legislation was introduced in 2012 by Senator
Daniel Akaka (D-Haw.) with Senate Bill 3685, but it similarly did not leave
the SCIA.397
On May 9, 2013, SCIA Chairwoman Senator Cantwell (D-Wash.) and
Chairman Barrasso (R-Wy.) reintroduced the legislation as Senate Bill 919,

393. H.R. REP. NO. 111-603 (2010). But see Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, General
Memorandum 10-118 (Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter General Memorandum 10-118], available at
http://www.npaihb.org/images/resources_docs/weeklymailout/2010/october/week1/GM_10-11
8_SelfGovBillApproved_by_House.pdf (describing how the published House Report differs
from the passed legislation due to late amendments).
394. H.R. 4347, To Amend the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
to Provide Further Self-Governance by Indian Tribes, and for Other Purposes: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010).
395. See General Memorandum 10-118, supra note 393, at 1.
396. Id. at 2.
397. Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2012, S. 3685, 112th
Cong.
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the “Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2013.”398
Hearings on Senate Bill 919 were held on January 29, 2014, and the bill
was reported out of the Committee in August 2014. The Congressional
Budget Office released its report on the bill on November 13, 2014, and
determined that passage of the bill would no net effect on spending. Despite
this encouraging development, passage during the current Congress appears
unlikely, but tribes will continue to push for passage in spite of the
increasingly partisan political environment. 399
After over two decades, tribes persist in pursuing Title IV amendments.
The remaining long-term issues of contention mainly involve non-BIA
Programs. Tribes would like to expand the scope of mandatory compacting
to programs of which Indians are significant beneficiaries, as opposed to
exclusive beneficiaries under the current DOI interpretation.400 The current
statutory language within Title IV gives DOI bureaus too much discretion
and negotiating leverage. Finally, non-BIA agencies within the DOI have
consistently opposed efforts that would enhance tribal ability to assume
more non-BIA programs on a mandatory basis.
As the cases described above illustrate, tribes need these types of strong
statutory protections given the DOI's historical and continuing resistance to
self-governance. Amending Title IV to bring it into line with Title V would
greatly simplify self-governance for tribes by creating a relatively uniform
legal regime for both agencies.
D. Title VI and the Expansion of Self-Governance within DHHS
Another key legislative initiative is to implement the demonstration
project for non-IHS agencies within the DHHS. Although the DHHS has
already found this expansion of self-governance viable in its feasibility
study of 2003, the agency can be expected to continue its opposition to
actual legislation.401
The central issue is that the Title VI demonstration project would
devolve control of PFSAs from DHHS agencies to tribes. To the extent that
non-IHS agencies deal with tribes at all, it is through a grantor-grantee
relationship that allows the agencies to impose strict controls on the use of
398. The House companion bill, House Bill 4546, was introduced by Rep. Peter DeFazio
(D-Or.) on May 1, 2014.
399. See, e.g., Congress Set to Pass Historically Few Laws in 2013, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/11/news/la-pn-congress-few-laws-2013-2013 1211.
400. See supra Part III.D. See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 1000.123–124 (2000).
401. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450j(o), 450j-1(C) (2012) (recounting DHHS resistance to Title VI
bill in 2003-2004).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

64

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

agency resources. Such a relationship differs markedly from the
government-to-government relationship under self-governance, where tribal
contractors can redesign programs and reallocate funds to suit tribal needs
rather than agency priorities. Shifting from a grantor-grantee to a selfgovernance relationship would also require federal officials to emerge from
their offices and actively negotiate compacts and funding agreements with
participating tribes and tribal organizations.
The contrast between a grantor-grantee mentality and a government-togovernment relationship poses an intangible but very real obstacle to the
further expansion of tribal self-governance within the federal government.
In 2011, the DHHS created a Self-Governance Tribal Federal Workgroup
(SGTFW) to further explore the findings of the 2003 feasibility study
(concluding that self-governance expansion was possible within the
DHHS).402 When the SGTFW issued its Final Report in September 2013, it
focused in on many of the grant programs within the DHHS, and found that
“[t]he overarching barrier to expansion of Self-Governance is the lack of
legislative authority to conduct a Self-Governance demonstration project in
HHS programs outside of IHS.”403 The Workgroup found that Title VI
authorized the 2003 feasibility study, but that the ISDEAA itself limits the
DHHS grant programs that can be incorporated into funding agreements
under Title V.404 Nonetheless, the DHHS took the position that the
Workgroup was not authorized to work on legislation to overcome the
perceived legal and logistical barriers to the expansion of selfgovernance.405 Following the Final Report, tribal members of the SGTFW
requested that the Department expand the charge of the SGTFW, or
establish a new working group, to develop draft legislation to implement a
Title VI demonstration project. The Secretary of the DHHS, however,
denied this request, stating “[t]he Department does not have plans to create
a Workgroup for purposes of working on draft [self-governance] legislation
with tribal representatives.”406 Although the Final Report concludes that
402. See DHHS Self-Governance Tribal Fed. Workgroup, Final Report 4 (Sept. 26,
2013).
403. Id. at 8.
404. Id. (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4(b)(1)-(2) (limiting incorporation of grant
programs into ISDEAA compacts and funding agreements to grant programs that are
“carried out for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians”)).
405. See id. at 11-12.
406. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of DHHS, to Chairwoman Malerba,
Mohegan Tribe (July 26, 2013) (addressed also to tribal co-signers of June 4, 2013 letter
requesting SGTFW continuation on legislation).
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“[e]xpansion of Self-Governance in HHS remains a priority,”407 it will
likely fall to tribes to develop and advocate legislation to implement the
expansion of self-governance to non-IHS agencies within the DHHS, as
envisioned in Title VI.
Another example of this dynamic—the federal bureaucracy's inherent
resistance to yielding its control and funding to tribes—can be seen in the
DHHS's and the BIA's recent change in position on so-called “477 Plans.”
The 477 Program, named after Public Law 102-477,408 allows tribes to
consolidate previously fragmented employment and training-related grant
funds from the Departments of Labor, DOI, and DHHS into a single 477
Plan with a unified budget and reporting system. For many years, 477 funds
have been transferred to self-governance tribes through ISDEAA Title IV
agreements. But in October, 2008, in the waning days of the Bush
administration, the DHHS announced that funding for 477 Plans would no
longer be transferred through ISDEAA agreements. Reportedly, the Interior
Solicitor's Office determined that there was no legal authority to provide
Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) funds and possibly other
funds in 477 Plans through ISDEAA agreements, although DOI did not
release any formal legal analysis to that effect. Instead of ISDEAA
agreements, the agencies proposed that the 477 funds would be transferred
through a grant process administered under DOI regulations.409 Then, in
2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), at the request of the
DHHS, issued Circular A-133, a compliance supplement which required
477 tribes to report 477 expenditures separately by funding source rather
than by expenditure under a tribal 477 Plan. These changes would give the
DOI and the DHHS significantly more control over how tribes administer,
account for, and report on 477 funds. The agencies have so far delayed
implementation of these unilateral changes, and different legislative efforts
have been made to correct the problems tribes have encountered from this
change.410 The most recent legislative effort to “fix 477” is Senate Bill
407. DHHS Self-Governance Tribal Fed. Workgroup, supra note 402, at 14.
408. Indian Employment, Training, and Related Services Demonstration Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-477, 106 Stat. 2302 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3417
(2012)).
409. See 43 C.F.R. pt. 12 (2014); 25 C.F.R. pt. 276 (2014).
410. Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, General Memorandum 13-101 (Nov. 18, 2013)
(discussing the attempt by the House Appropriations Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies Subcommittee to include language in section 430 of the FY 2012 appropriations
bill that would have resolved the tribal-federal agencies differences in the 477 Program). The
federal agencies opposed the change which led to the Appropriations conferees agreement to
defer consideration of legislation in exchange for agency agreement for the formation of the
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1574, which was introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) on
October 16, 2013. Under the proposed amendments, all funds for programs
and services covered by an approved 477 plan would be transferred to a
tribe or tribal organization pursuant to an existing contract, compact, or
funding agreement under ISDEAA, and tribes and tribal organizations
could combine federal funds for use in performing allowable activities
authorized under an approved 477 Plan, with no requirement to maintain
separate records tracing services or activities for audit purposes.411
The 477 controversy involves some of the same issues, and even
programs, as the Title VI initiative.412 In both cases, the federal agencies
wish to retain a grantor-grantee relationship with tribes, as opposed to
government-to-government relationships under the ISDEAA. The inherent
tension between tribal self-governance and federal bureaucratic control will
make it difficult, if not impossible, for tribal and federal representatives to
agree on the precise contours of new Title VI legislation (or the 477 fix).
Congress is well aware of this tension, however, and can resolve any
deadlocks.
Despite likely DHHS opposition, tribes will no doubt press forward with
another Title VI bill and legislative 477 fix. Direct tribal operation of nonIHS DHHS programs, such as TANF and Head Start, would be a major
achievement, yet should also be relatively non-controversial. The DHHS's
own study demonstrates the feasibility of the Title VI demonstration
project, limiting the agency's ability to obstruct proposed legislation
without appearing unreasonable. And as the Senate recognized ten years
ago, Title VI represents simply the next logical step in the “evolution in
tribal self-governance.”413

“P.L. 102-477 Administrative Flexibility Work Group” which included policy and program
representatives from the tribes and DOI, HHS, DOL, and OMB. After two years of meetings
and negotiations, the “Flexibility” group did not reach any agreement on these issues). The
agencies have apparently dropped the proposed funding change and will continue to transfer
funds through the ISDEAA, and have proposed reporting requirements by “functional
category” based on expenditures under tribal 477 Plans. See 79 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 14,
2014).
411. Id. at 2.
412. 477 programs also identified in the Title VI feasibility study and included as part of
the proposed demonstration program include TANF, the Child Care and Development Fund,
and Native Employment Works.
413. S. REP. NO. 108-412, at 2 (2004).
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E. Expansion of Self-Governance Beyond the DOI and the DHHS
The logical culmination of tribal self-governance as a statutory
relationship is to bring tribes' relationships with every government agency
under a single ISDEAA compact. That is, every agency that operates
PFSAs with Indians as significant beneficiaries would be authorized to
compact a tribe's share of those PFSAs and associated funding upon tribal
request.
Candidates for such programs abound. Even a cursory look at other
Cabinet level Departments and executive agencies in the federal
government reveals opportunities for further ISDEAA expansion,
particularly with established programs on which tribes rely to protect their
ancestral homelands and/or for the efficient operation of tribal government.
While not by any means an exhaustive list, the following examples
demonstrate some of the immediate opportunities within the federal
government for the expansion of tribal self-governance under the ISDEAA.
1. Department of Transportation
Tribal representatives have long advocated establishing a selfgovernance program within the Department of Transportation (DOT), either
via an amendment to Title IV414 or as part of a broader highway
reauthorization bill.415 The 2005 highway bill, SAFETEA-LU,416 authorized
tribal governments to enter into agreements directly with the Secretary of
Transportation “in accordance with the [ISDEAA].”417 Some DOT officials
interpreted this language to mean that the agreements must be consistent
with the ISDEAA, but are not really ISDEAA agreements; consequently the
DOT has refused to include standard Title IV provisions in their
agreements. This erroneous interpretation generated a great deal of
confusion and disagreement over the extent to which Title IV applies to
414. E.g., Dep't of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2007: Hearings on H.R.
3996 Before the House Committee on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 5-7 (2007) (statement
of W. Ron Allen); id. at 5-6 (statement of Melanie Benjamin). Both tribal leaders quote the
proposed section 419, which would have established a tribal self-governance program in
DOT, and explain its rationale, in their testimony. Id. at 5-7.
415. See American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012, H.R. 7, 112th Cong., §
1506 (establishing “Tribal Transportation Self-Governance Program” in DOT). This
provision was not included in the Senate version of the highway bill that was eventually
enacted, as discussed infra.
416. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
417. 23 U.S.C. § 202(b)(7)(A) (2012).
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those agreements. Meanwhile, although SAFETEA-LU expanded tribes’
ability to directly access the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) program
for tribes to widen public transportation services on Indian reservations,418
Congress did not extend the ISDEAA to the Tribal Transit Program. In its
rulemaking process, despite numerous tribal comments, the FTA refused to
consider developing a tribal transit grant agreement modeled on ISDEAA
grant agreements.419
On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed into law the first long-term
highway authorization enacted since 2005: the Moving Ahead for Progress
in the 21st Century Act.420 MAP-21, as it is known, has brought increased
funding for surface transportation programs, including over $105 billion for
FYs 2013 and 2014 across the entire transportation budget.421 It has also
made several changes that are specific to tribes, including a shift from what
was previously referred to as the Indian Reservation Roads (IRR) program
to the more broadly defined “Tribal Transportation Program” under MAP21.422 Although tribes have repeatedly proven themselves capable of
utilizing increased federal transportation infrastructure funds and other
transportation program services, both the DOT and the DOI have continued
to resist fully applying the provisions of the ISDEAA to transportation
programs. MAP-21 did not fix that problem, notwithstanding the efforts of
tribal leaders to address those concerns. The legislative process that led to
the authorization of MAP-21 in the House included developing specific
legislation known as “Section 1506. Tribal Transportation Self-Governance
Program” as part of House Bill 7, the “American Energy and Infrastructure
Act of 2012.”423 This proposed legislation was included in the House of
Representatives’ transportation legislation as part of House Resolution 547,
but it was not included in the Senate bill, nor was it enacted into law as part
of MAP-21. The proposed language in House Bill 7’s section 1506 would
have removed any ongoing doubt that the negotiation and implementation
of tribal funding agreements with the DOT would be governed by Title IV,
418. 49 U.S.C. § 5311(c) (2012).
419. See FTA, Public Transportation on Indian Reservations Program; Tribal Transit
Program, 71 FED. REG. 46,959, 46,962 (Aug. 15, 2006).
420. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act or MAP-21, Pub. L. No. 112141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012).
421. Office of Policy & Governmental Affairs, Fed. Highway Admin, Map-21: A
Summary of Highway Provisions 1 (July 17, 2012), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
map21/docs/map21_summary_hgwy_provisions.pdf.
422. 23 U.S.C. § 202.
423. See generally H. REP. NO. 112-397 (2012).
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including a requirement that any secretarial interpretation of federal law
should facilitate the inclusion of PFSAs (and associated funding) within
fully implemented self-governance compacts and AFAs.424
As of this writing, though, the need for the extension of self-governance
to the DOT is made even clearer by the implementation of MAP-21 by the
DOT and the BIA. On May 12, 2012, the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) of the DOT commenced an analysis of the Tribal Transportation
Program that continued until August 2013.425 The OIG analysis was cursory
and limited to data-gathering from very few tribes, but nonetheless it
concluded, in part, that greater oversight and more comprehensive access to
remedial actions are warranted for tribes not meeting program
requirements.426 Unfortunately, federal opposition to the expansion of tribal
self-governance over transportation programs was reflected in initial draft
regulations shared by the agencies during tribal consultations in 2013 and
intended to implement the tribal provisions in MAP-21.427 Tribes are
prepared to work diligently to share more representative examples of
successful tribal transportation programs with the DOT and coordinate
efforts so that the MAP-21 rulemaking results in regulations that are
consistent with the ISDEAA. When the next major highway reauthorization
occurs (expected in FY 2015), tribes will be prepared once again to make
the case for the extension of self-governance within the DOT.
2. Department of Justice
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) plays a very important
federal role with respect to tribes given primary federal jurisdiction over
Indian lands and people, as well as ongoing law enforcement
responsibilities that are a function of that federal jurisdiction.428 In 2010,
424. H.R. 7, § 1506 (proposed section 207(j)).
425. Office of Inspector Gen., Fed. Highway Admin., Opportunities Exist to Strengthen
FHWA’s Coordination, Guidance, and Oversight of the Tribal Transportation Program,
Rept. No. MH 2014-003 (Oct. 2013), available at http://flh.fhwa.dot.gov/programs/ttp/docu
ments/oig-audit-report.pdf.
426. Id. at 10.
427. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs: Tribal Consultation on the
Draft Regulations Governing the Tribal Transportation Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 21861, 21861
(Apr. 12, 2013) (describing dates, locations, and purpose of tribal consultation on proposed
regulations for 25 C.F.R. Part 170).
428. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (“State
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”)
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recognizing the wide range of programs that impacted Indian tribes and
Alaskan Natives, as well as the complexity of having tribes access those
programs on an ongoing basis, the DOJ created the Coordinated Tribal
Assistance Solicitation (CTAS).429 In FY 2014, the CTAS offers eligible
tribes the opportunity, through a single application, to request funding from
nine distinct programs within the DOJ: public safety and community
policing; comprehensive planning for justice systems; tribal courts
assistance in alcohol and substance abuse prevention programs; corrections
and corrections alternatives; violence against women; violence against
children; crime victims assistance programs; juvenile justice; and tribal
youth prevention programs.430
While this departmental coordination within the DOJ allowing for the
effective administration of grant-funded programs impacting Indian
Country is a step in the right direction, at least one major analysis of the
DOJ has found that it does not go far enough.431 One of the most important
and comprehensive reports ever on justice in Indian Country was released
by the Indian Law and Order Commission (Commission) in November
2013.432 Among many excellent recommendations for improving law and
order in Indian Country, the Commission identified the need for the
potential expansion of the ISDEAA within the DOJ.433 Citing the lack of
collaboration and cooperation between BIA law enforcement and DOJ
programs, the Commission recommended consolidating these functions
within a new agency in the DOJ and allowing tribes to contract with that
agency under the ISDEAA.434 “Some of these problems could be resolved if
Tribal governments were able to access DOJ Indian country resources via
[Title I] contracts, self-governance compacts, or P.L. 102-477 funding
agreements, all of which allow Tribal governments to take over
management of Federal funds.”435 This call for extending the ISDEAA to
the DOJ makes sense, especially in the context of the Commission’s

429. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COORDINATED TRIBAL ASSISTANCE SOLICITATION FOR FY
2014 FACT SHEET (2014).
430. Id. at 3.
431. See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE
AMERICA SAFER (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter ROADMAP].
432. Id. The Indian Law and Order Commission is a federal commission that was
created by Congress with the passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. See
generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2815 (2012).
433. ROADMAP, supra note 431, at 87.
434. Id. at 85, 87, 89.
435. Id. at 87.
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emphasis throughout the Report on the need to empower local tribal
communities to take control of and accountability for law enforcement.436
3. Department of Agriculture
As with other cabinet level departments, the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) has a wide range of programs and activities that directly impact
tribes and Indian lands. Recent legislation points to one specific example of
a USDA program where ISDEAA expansion is the logical next step:
implementation of the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004.437 The Tribal
Forest Protection Act essentially authorizes the Secretaries of Agriculture
and the Interior to give special consideration to tribally proposed
Stewardship Contracting (or other projects) on Forest Service and Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) land bordering or adjacent to Indian trust land
in order to protect Indian trust resources from fire, disease, or other threats
arising from the Forest Service or BLM land.438
The Tribal Forest Protection Act has some similarities to the ISDEAA
structurally, including similar eligibility criteria, delineation of how and
why proposals can be declined, and reports back to Congress on
implementation.439 However, there is no specific authorization of funding or
right to funding, and the Act does not reference the ISDEAA as an
appropriate authority for agreements or incorporate its other protections. In
order for the USDA to fully implement the Tribal Forest Protection Act of
2004, it would be logical for Congress to extend to that Act all of the
ISDEAA’s provisions and protections, such as FTCA coverage.
4. Department of Homeland Security
Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies and
programs impact tribes and tribal lands. Recent amendments to the Stafford
Act, through provisions contained in the Sandy Relief Act of 2012, provide
tribes expanded authority to administer various Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) programs.440 Tribes now have the capacity
436. See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (recommending that Congress allow tribes to “opt out” of
federal Indian country criminal jurisdiction and/or congressionally authorized state
jurisdiction, except for federal laws of general application, and “recognize the Tribe’s
inherent criminal jurisdiction”); id. at 43-44 (discussing Alaska communities where, often,
tribes constitute the only day-to-day governmental presence).
437. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 3115a (2012).
438. Id. § 3115a(a)(4), (b)(1), (c)(1)-(3).
439. Id. § 3115a(c), (d), (g).
440. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2012).
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to work with FEMA directly, rather than through state government, in
declaring national emergencies on tribal lands, seeking assistance to address
damage from emergencies, and carrying out hazard mitigation planning
activities to mitigate or prevent future emergencies on tribal lands.441
These programs and activities are a logical point for expansion of the
ISDEAA, as the intent of these new tribal authorities within the Stafford
Act is to increase tribal self-determination and sovereignty in the face of
crisis and disaster. Congress should consider allowing tribes to utilize the
familiar contractual, legal, and funding mechanisms of the ISDEAA during
a disaster, when FEMA support and funding are needed, by extending the
ISDEAA to its recent expansion of tribal rights under the Stafford Act.
5. Environmental Protection Agency
Since 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has provided
support to federally recognized tribes to build internal environmental
program capacity through its Indian General Assistance Program (IGAP).442
The importance of the EPA IGAP program in Indian Country cannot be
overstated, as it provides many tribes, particularly small tribes, with muchneeded financial support without which these tribes would not have an
environmental program. In its recent IGAP guidance, the EPA explained
that its OIG had examined the efficacy of the IGAP in 2008, and found that
it lacked uniform implementation nationally.443 It suggested, in part, that the
EPA should “[r]evise how IGAP funding is distributed to tribes to place
more emphasis on tribes’ prior progress, environmental capacity needs, and
long-term goals.”444
The over-arching goal of the IGAP is to build tribal capacity, and the
ultimate ends of tribal capacity are self-determination and self-governance.
The EPA IGAP is a logical opportunity for ISDEAA expansion within the
EPA, as the IGAP provides tribes the opportunity to identify internal tribal
programmatic needs from year to year, with the goal of self-directed tribal
leadership to meet those needs through program administration. Through
441. See FEMA, Frequently Asked Questions: Process for Tribal Governments to Request
a Presidential Declaration (Oct. 2013, available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1383332744585-e4c4534105a89fc66ff397216e39afb7/FAQs%20-%20Declaration%20Reque
st%20Process%20for%20Tribal%20Governments.pdf.
442. See EPA, GUIDANCE ON THE AWARD AND MANAGEMENT OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENTS FOR TRIBES AND INTERTRIBAL CONSORTIA at iii-iv (2013), available at
http://www.epa.gov/tribal/GAP-guidance-final.pdf (regarding “Final Guidance on the Award
and Management of General Assistance Agreements for Tribes and Intertribal Consortia”).
443. Id. at 14.
444. Id. at iv.
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tribal-EPA consultation, the ISDEAA could be extended to the IGAP, and
potentially other EPA programs,445 to simultaneously advance tribal
environmental health and administrative capacity.
6. Department of Defense
In the Department of Defense (DOD), there are a wide range of programs
that impact tribes. There are many instances where the extension of the
ISDEAA would be a logical next step. For example, Congress has, since
1993, inserted a provision in the DOD Appropriations Act requiring the
DOD to devote funds annually to mitigate its environmental impacts to
Indian lands and lands conveyed under the Alaskan Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA).446 The Native American Lands Environmental
Mitigation Program (NALEMP) has generally administered from $8-10
million per year, mitigating DOD damage to tribal lands.447 A number of
tribes have utilized this program to identify problem areas created by the
DOD and clean up their ancestral homelands. However, the agreement
structure for the NALEMP program has centered around DOD-defined
Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) and Cooperative Agreements rather
than extending the provisions of the ISDEAA to allow tribes greater
programmatic management and oversight over these efforts.448
These are merely a small illustrative listing of logical programs for
potential extension of the ISDEAA further beyond the DOI and the DHHS.
One challenge will be the tendency of federal agencies to leave grant
programs, and grant funding, under strict regulatory schemes and limited
program guidance. Another challenge will be to help agencies overcome
their tendency to see their funding agreements with tribes as merely solesource procurement contracts, rather than true self-determination
agreements.449 As Congress has recognized, however, these government-to445. Under various federal environmental laws, Indian tribes are treated as states for the
purposes of implementing elements of broad regulatory schemes, including the Clean Water
Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
Consideration should also be given to extending the ISDEAA to the funding mechanisms
associated with these “treatment as state” programs for tribes.
446. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 11112 (appropriating $12 million for mitigation of environmental impacts on Indian lands
resulting from DOD activities).
447. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NALEMP IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 2 (Apr. 2005).
448. Id. at 8.
449. King, supra note 244, at 524-25 (describing National Park Service view of selfgovernance through lens of procurement contracting).
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government agreements are akin to solemn treaties as well as ordinary
contracts:
Treaties are a significant part of the legal relationship between
Indian tribes and the United States. Self-governance, by its use
of compacts, another traditional contracting device used between
governments, is designed to honor the government-togovernment relationship and remind the parties to these
agreements of the historical basis for their relationship.450
V. Conclusion: Self-Governance in an Evolving Political Context
Our focus has been on self-governance as a statutory right of federally
recognized tribes, under the ISDEAA, to administer federal programs for
their own people according to their own priorities. The ISDEAA and the
many contracts and compacts it has spawned over the years have helped
further the movement away from pervasive federal control and towards
tribal autonomy. The ISDEAA, however, is only one aspect of a larger
movement toward tribal self-rule in economic and political spheres.
Contracting and compacting federal programs brings jobs to tribal
communities and builds tribal administrative capacity, but tribes also
exercise self-determination through economic development, cultural
activity, language revitalization, and other aspects of nation-building. There
is no doubt that the federal policy of self-determination in general, and the
ISDEAA in particular, have played a significant role in strengthening tribal
governments and communities over the past forty years.451 Conversely, as
tribes experience more success exercising their sovereignty in a variety of
contexts, this larger movement can be expected to drive changes in Title IV,
Title V, and future self-governance statutes.
The evolving political context within which tribal self-governance itself
evolves is largely beyond tribal control. For now, the traditional bipartisan
support in Congress for Indian self-determination is largely intact, but some
observers see that bipartisanship eroding as conservatives move away from
the libertarian themes exemplified in President Nixon’s 1970 address.452 If
tribal self-governance becomes identified solely as a Democratic or liberal
450. H.R. REP. NO. 106-477, at 17 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 573, 575.
451. See generally Cornell & Kalt, supra note 6, at 12-16 (“[T]he overall pattern of
results [from tribal self-determination] in Indian Country is quite positive, and the reasons lie
in the facts that local decision making and administration (1) improve accountability and (2)
allow on-the-ground programs and policies to better reflect local values.”).
452. Id. at 18, 27 (discussing President Nixon’s address on tribal self-determination).
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cause, the legislative reforms and advances discussed above will become
much more difficult to achieve. Tribal leaders have long been successful in
tying self-governance to larger federal policy initiatives, both conservative
and liberal, from the civil rights movement of the 1960s, to the
“devolution” of social programs from federal to state and local control in
the 1980s and 1990s, to the current “wars” on drugs and terrorism.453 But
one thing is certain: whatever particular legislative and administrative
forms and vehicles tribal self-governance takes in the future, it is, and will
remain, a fundamental right under United States and international law.454

453. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV.
777, 795-96 (2006) (citation omitted) (quoting Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the
Architecture of Federalism—An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in
Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227 (1996)).
454. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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